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SUMMARY
LIVELIHOOD ANALYSIS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN GREATER AMMAN \ E. GRAWERT 
Jordan, with a population of about ten million, hosts 1.3 million Syrians of whom 
670,000 are UNHCR-registered refugees, as well as nearly 85,000 registered refugees from 
other countries and is thus one of the countries with the highest proportion of refugees 
in the world. Most of them (83 per cent) are staying outside camps and many have rented 
flats mainly in the Jordanian capital Amman and its surroundings.  
The particular conditions for refugees from Syria staying in a receiving area among peo-
ple with a history of protracted displacement are in the focus of this Working Paper. How 
do refugees from Syria secure their livelihood in the neighbourhoods of Palestinians 
who share the experience of a volatile legal status and limited economic rights? Does 
the EU–Jordan Compact improve Syrians’ livelihoods?  
These questions are addressed by an analytical livelihood approach that includes social 
relationships as a significant conducive or constraining factor for refugees’ agency (abil-
ity to act) in making use of local livelihood options. The findings generated in field re-
search between November 2016 and July 2017 reveal dynamics within the Palestinian re-
ceiving community that have shifted from empathy and solidarity to more ambiguous 
interaction up to the exploitation and seclusion of refugees. The Paper shows how self-or-
ganised assistance groups of Jordanians with Palestinian origin take care of refugees 
from Syria in dire need for help, no matter what legal status they have. They support 
some refugees in regaining their agency and thus contribute to securing their livelihood.  
The central argument of this Paper is that the agenda of international aid and develop-
ment agencies of enhancing resilience and promoting self-reliance of refugees does not 
strengthen refugees’ agency. Instead of considering the refugees’ own priorities and in-
tentions about their livelihood, it pre-designs basic needs to different refugee groups and 
attempts to integrate them into a presumed market economy that in fact is distorted for 
political purposes (mainly shielding Jordanians from foreign competitors). 
This is most pronounced in the EU–Jordan Compact, established to provide Syrians with 
preferential access to (low-skilled) employment in return for alleviated access of Jordanian 
companies to the European market. The study discloses how the Compact contradicts 
the idea of resilience of the refugees. In the conclusion, the Paper questions the collusion 
of the international community with the Jordanian government in using the presence 
of the refugees for external interests—promoting liberal market expansion through the 
EU–Jordan Compact in return for continuous aid. 
2 \ 
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‘established’ and ‘outsiders’ in the Palestinian settle-
ments (UNRWA-run camps). This gap manifests itself 
most when it comes to gender relations characterised 
by the subjugation of refugee women and girls.
Self-organised groups initiated by  
Jordanians with Palestinian origin and 
Syrians assist refugees according to 
their needs, thus encouraging refugees’ 
agency 
Some of these groups risk imprisonment because 
they also provide aid to illegal refugees. The non-  
bureaucratic assistance, however, fits into the refugees’ 
own ideas of a life of dignity, which include social, 
cultural, psychological and religious needs besides 
material aid. Different from professional international 
agencies, these groups respond flexibly and rapidly to 
the specific demands of refugees independent of their 
status and do not impose an external agenda upon them.
The EU–Jordan Compact does not  
reflect the livelihood intentions of its 
target group 
The common interest of the Compact Parties is to 
shift the burden of caring for large numbers of refugees 
to the employers in designated factories in Jordan’s 
free economic zones. External actors from the Euro-
pean Union thus exploit the economic and social 
pressure on the Jordanian government by the high 
numbers of refugees. Ultimately, refugees are a simple 
means to strike a deal toward Jordan’s market expan-
sion and formalisation of its economy. However, Syrian 
refugees have various motives why they do not take 
up low-paid jobs in factories, and there are many  
reasons why Jordanian companies hesitate to employ 
Syrians. 
 
Despite many constraints, refugees 
from Syria try to maintain or regain a 
way of life that they consider neces-
sary for keeping their human dignity 
Priorities of refugees from Syria are safety, privacy 
for families, access to social services and income- 
generation through appropriate jobs. Avoiding refugee 
camps and moving to Greater Amman is a conscious 
decision to use livelihood options closer to their own 
standard of a dignified, self-determined way of life. 
The interest in keeping bureaucratic 
control over the refugees determines 
the cooperation between the Jordanian 
government and UN agencies 
This common interest sets the framework for hu-
manitarian assistance for specified (vulnerable) target 
groups in health care and basic needs while excluding 
non-registered groups of refugees from Syria.   
The agenda of international aid and  
development agencies of enhancing 
resilience and promoting self-reliance 
of refugees does not strengthen the 
refugees’ ability to act ('agency')
This agenda does not consider the refugees’ own 
priorities and intentions about their livelihood. It 
rather pre-designs basic needs for different refugee 
groups and attempts to integrate them into a pre-
sumed market economy that is distorted for political 
purposes (mainly shielding Jordanians from foreign 
competitors). 
Refugees from Syria benefit from the 
solidarity of Palestinian–Jordanians; 
however, the longer Syrians are dis-
placed, the more they are treated as 
outsiders by host communities  
Besides distorted prices for rent and commodities, 
the availability of aid, social inequality and class  
differences contribute to a widening gap between 
Main findings
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I just thought that maybe my story could be worth 
being written. I might write it myself one day.
This was the answer of a 50-year-old Syrian woman, 
a former teacher, in Amman in January 2017, when the 
researchers 1 —worried because the talk faltered slightly—
had asked if the author's  note-taking disturbed her. It 
was the second meeting with her, and the interview 
finally lasted for more than four hours. The woman 
was a Syrian refugee in Amman and one of the persons 
the author visited to understand how refugees made 
their living on the outset of a protracted refugee situa-
tion—forced to remain displaced for at least five years.
As much research on Syrian refugees has already 
been conducted in the Jordanian camps located in the 
north of the country near the Syrian border, 2 this 
study focuses on the less researched groups of Syrians 
who live in protracted displacement situations in the 
Jordanian capital Amman and its surroundings. 
Greater Amman, which includes the city and reaches 
into Balqa Governorate in the north-west, is an area 
where the majority of Syrian families and individuals 
have sought refuge after leaving the camps in northern 
Jordan, determined to try and make their living in 
town. In Amman city alone, the United Nations Refu-
gee Agency (UNHCR) has registered 179,887 refugees 
from Syria, that is, 27 per cent of all registered Syrian 
refugees in 2017 (UNHCR, 2017). Including the unregis-
tered refugees and migrants, Amman hosted an esti-
mated 435,578 Syrians in 2016 (Ghazal, 2016). Only the 
most vulnerable among the registered refugees are el-
igible for assistance by the UNHCR. Those who are not 
registered live at risk of being caught by the police as 
illegals who will be deported or at least, arrested in a 
temporary camp near the Syrian border. 
1 \  The research team consisted of the author and two local assistants 
(see section on methods of field research). The author is deeply grateful 
to the research assistants without whose help in collecting data the 
study would not have reached the depth and comprehensiveness pre-
sented in this Paper. Special thanks go to Conrad Schetter, Ruth Vollmer, 
Benjamin Etzold, Clara Schmitz-Pranghe, Katja Mielke and Mohammed 
Y. Aburok, whose comments contributed greatly to improve the clarity 
of the argument.
2 \  Among others, cf. Coutts & Fouad (2013) on the health crisis in the camps; 
Farishta (2014) on the impact of refugees in camps on Jordan’s water 
resources; Wall et al. (2015) on information precarity in the camps. 
Some academic livelihood or work-related studies have been conduc-
ted in refugee camps and in the northern Jordanian cities of Irbid and 
al-Mafraq (Betts & Collier, 2015; Turner, 2015; Achilli, 2016; Bank, 2016).
Introduction
Box 1  
Refugees in Jordan
Jordanians have long been used to receive migrants and refugees from 
the region; the history of Amman itself is a history of settlers that  
established ever new quarters and thus shaped the structure of the city. 
Extrapolations of the Jordanian Department of Statistics calculated 
10,265,514 inhabitants of Jordan in October 2018 (DoS, 2018). Accord-
ing to the national census of 2016, about one third of the inhabitants 
of Amman are non-Jordanians (see also Annex I for an overview of ref-
ugees in Jordan’s governorates). The census of 2016 stated that out of 
the total non-Jordanian population, 1.265 million were Syrians, 
636,270 Egyptians and there were 634,182 Palestinians that did not 
hold national identity cards. Iraqi nationals amounted to 130,911, and 
there were altogether 251,248 people from further smaller nationalities 
(Ghazal, 2016). 
The largest group of people in a protracted refugee situation in Jordan 
are the Palestinians, who arrived in two large waves after the Arab– 
Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967. Whereas the Palestinians arriving in 
1948 received Jordanian citizenship, most of those coming after 1967 
got temporary residence permits to be renewed every two to five years 
(El-Abed, 2004, 2005; Chatelard, 2010; for an overview of the various 
status of Palestinians in Jordan see Annex II). In 2017, the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) had registered 2,175,491 
Palestinian refugees staying in ten official camps in Jordan. Two of 
these camps are inside Amman (al-Hussayn and Wihdat), and three 
are in Greater Amman (Talbieh, Hittin (Marka), and Baqaa), hosting 
186,442 Palestinian inhabitants that are registered with the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) besides many other  
inhabitants (UNRWA, 2017). 
Nearly one million refugees from Iraq had arrived in 1991 and 2003; in 
2016, there were still about 130,000 Iraqi refugees staying in Jordan 
(Ghazal, 2016). Syrian refugees started to arrive in Jordan in 2011. In 
2012, 176,020 and in 2013, an estimated 301,620 refugees entered Jor-
dan, of whom the UNHCR registered more than 290,000. In 2016, 
about 44,000 new Syrian refugees were registered (ACAPS, 2014; UN-
HCR, 2017b). In July 2017, the UNHCR had registered a total of 
661,114 Syrian refugees in Jordan. By October 2018, the number of Syr-
ian refugees registered with the UNHCR had increased to 671,919 per-
sons (UNHCR, 2018c), mainly because of a high birth rate of Syrians 
and the rejection of contraceptives by Syrian men (Alabaster, 2016). 
Among the non-registered Syrian refugees, there are an estimated 
17,000 Syrians with Palestinian origin (Amin, 2017). Only 17 per cent 
of the Syrian refugees are staying in camps, whereas 83 per cent are 
living in urban areas (UNHCR, 2018). 
Of the estimated four million inhabitants of Amman, 1,441,300 were 
non-Jordanians, among them 435,578 Syrians in 2016. There were 
about 308,091 Palestinians who did not hold a Jordanian identity card 
(Ghazal, 2016). Jordan always has been a receiving country for Syrian 
migrants, and including these, the government of Jordan estimated the 
total number of Syrians living in Jordan at above 1.3 million in 2017 
(MOPIC, 2018). 
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In Greater Amman, many Syrian refugees have rented 
flats from Jordanians with Palestinian origin (Pales-
tinian–Jordanians 4) or stay in Palestinian camps 
 (that have become solid settlements over the decades) 
among Palestinian–Jordanian neighbours. How Syrian 
refugees interact with the earlier generations of refu-
gees from Palestine has not been studied yet. To close 
this research gap, the authors attempted to gain in-
sights into how Syrian refugees secure their livelihood 
under the constrained conditions of being ‘guests’ 
with a volatile legal status in Jordan. This Paper thus 
examines how staying in communities of earlier  
refugee generations of Palestinian–Jordanians affects 
the livelihood of Syrian refugees. 
‘Livelihood’ is used here as an analytical concept. 
Accordingly, securing one’s own or a family’s liveli-
hood requires the ability to act (‘agency’) of a collective 
(part of a family, the nuclear family, extended family 
or a larger community) that is directed towards main-
taining or re-achieving a way of life in dignity according 
to the standards of the collective. It takes on a per-
spective that is distinct from the ‘conditions of living’, 
which refer to the legal, political, social, or economic 
structures that constrain the scope of action of indi-
viduals and collectives (cf. also Grawert, 1998; De Haan, 
2017). 
To understand Syrian refugees’ actions particularly 
in Greater Amman and in Palestinian–Jordanian  
communities for maintaining a way of life in dignity, 
the author, together with the research assistants, con-
ducted livelihood research using qualitative methods 
of social research. The team focused on Syrian refu-
gees and Palestinian–Jordanian inhabitants, their his-
tories of displacement, and their interaction in Greater 
Amman, covering the period from November 2016 to 
July 2017. The following chapter outlines the analytical 
livelihood approach applied and the methods of re-
search, presents the conditions under which refugees 
are living in Greater Amman, and describes refugees’ 
4 \  ‘Palestinian–Jordanians’ refers to “Palestinians who were in Jordan on 
the date of the disengagement [of the Jordanian government from the 
West Bank in 1988] with no material connection to the West Bank or 
Gaza Strip, or who were Jordanian citizenship holders abroad. These 
are regarded as Jordanians for all legal purposes” (Jamjoum, 2011). The 
differences in legal status among Palestinians are outlined in Annex II.
As Jordan never joined the Geneva Refugee Con-
vention of 1951 or its extension through the Protocol 
of 1967, 3 refugees can neither receive a legal asylum 
status nor Jordanian citizenship. Instead, they are 
considered as ‘guests’, which leaves them to arbitrary 
and ever-changing treatment by the government. In 
1998, the government of Jordan agreed to a memoran-
dum of understanding with the UNHCR according to 
which the UNHCR can register refugees and provide 
them with basic humanitarian assistance for six 
months that can be extended. The government of Jor-
dan also accepted the principle of non-refoulement. 
The two parties renewed the memorandum of  
understanding in 2014 at the height of the mass arrival 
of Syrian refugees (ILO, 2015). In March 2018, the gov-
ernment of Jordan announced the ‘regularisation’ or 
‘amnesty’ for Syrians who had left Jordan’s refugee 
camps without government permission before July 
2017 to seek better living conditions in towns and cities 
(UNHCR, 2018b). According to this policy, the Ministry 
of the Interior (MoI) issues cards for refugees that had 
previously not registered with the UNHCR. The MoI 
card allows them to legally stay in Jordan outside of 
camps (IRC, 2018). About 20,000 Syrian refugees had 
approached the UNHCR for regularisation by October 
2018. The amnesty campaign has been extended until 
the end of March 2019 (Roya News, 2018). This policy 
change may increase the protection of Syrian refugees 
from arrests and punishment for illegal movement out-
side camps. However, many Syrian refugees do not meet 
Jordan’s stringent conditions to register as asylum seek-
ers and can be stopped by the police at any time. If they 
cannot prove that they left the camps lawfully, they 
may be arrested, involuntarily transferred to the refu-
gee camps or summarily deported to Syria (HRW, 2018). 
 
 
 
 
3 \  According to Article 1 A2 of the Geneva Refugee Convention, the Con-
vention referred only to refugees who had left their countries for cau-
ses that had occurred within Europe prior to 1951. The Protocol that 
was added in 1967 extends the validity of the Convention to refugees 
that left their countries of origin for causes occurring outside Europe 
and after 1951, through Art. 1, 2 of the Protocol (UNHCR, 2010).
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self-help capacity (‘agency’) in an environment that is 
characterised by many constraints. Next, the Paper 
looks from a livelihood perspective into the neigh-
bourhood relations of Syrian refugees in the largely 
Palestinian–Jordanian quarters of Amman and some 
suburbs, showing how relationships matter for the 
self-help capacity of the refugees. This is succeeded by 
a chapter describing collective activities by local initi-
atives to assist refugees. It examines different infor-
mal initiatives guided by the question whether they 
can be considered as an emerging social movement 
that fulfils relevant functions in families’ attempts to 
secure their livelihood. Earning an income is crucial 
for the livelihood of refugees. An entire chapter is ded-
icated to access to work and explains the restrictions 
to employment as well as the efforts of international 
agencies to create niches for Syrian refugees to enter 
the labour market legally. That chapter also shows 
why many Syrians refuse to take up these offers as 
their priorities to secure their livelihood are different 
from those of the agencies. In the Conclusion, the dif-
ferent interventions in the protracted displacement 
situation of Syrians in Jordan are compared in light of 
their conducive or constraining effects on the agency 
(ability to act) of different groups of refugees.
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The roots of the analytical livelihood approach 
and of ‘livelihoods programming’ applied by humani-
tarian agencies since 2012 stem from development 
studies of the late 1980s, in particular, Robert Chambers 
(1988) who established the ‘sustainable livelihoods 
approach’. During the 1990s, development agencies 
adopted the approach for projects aiming to reduce 
poverty, based on assessments of the activities people 
carry out to sustain their living. Characteristic for 
this approach has been putting people and their 
agency as well as their perceptions of constraints and 
opportunities in the centre instead of resources or 
structural factors (see among many others IFAD, no 
year; DFID, no year). ‘Agency’ is defined as the ability 
of people to act, comprising the capacity for self-help 
and the power to determine activities people regard 
as appropriate. 
‘Making a living’ in its meaning of earning suffi-
cient money is just one component of the academic 
concept of securing one’s livelihood that guided the 
research on refugees from Syria in Jordan. This Chapter 
outlines the analytical livelihood approach and then 
contrasts the academic livelihood approach with  
humanitarian agencies’ ‘livelihood programming’.  
An explanation of the methods applied to conduct 
the academic livelihood research follows. After that, 
the Chapter specifies the living conditions of Syrian 
refugees in Greater Amman based on the perceptions 
of interview partners during the author's field re-
search. The last part highlights the opportunities and 
constraints of the livelihood-related agency of the 
refugees.
Using a livelihood approach for  
research on refugees in receiving  
communities
From an analytical research perspective, a liveli-
hood does not only comprise access to housing,  
income, land, possession of assets, markets, social  
services, aid, support or remittances from family 
members staying elsewhere but also reciprocal or 
other relationships contributing to making a living 
of individuals or collectives, mainly (parts of) families. 
Hence, the focus is on people’ agency or self-help  
capacity originally present in the concept of Robert 
Chambers. Agency thus includes material efforts (jobs, 
growing food for personal use, accumulation of 
wealth, etc.) and social relationships. Crises, such as 
displacement due to war and violent conflict, affect 
the livelihood options available to social groups, clos-
ing some options and opening new ones, with great 
differences for disparate groups (Grawert, 1998a, 
Chapter 2). 
The analytical livelihood approach enables  
researchers to capture the dynamics that shape the 
lives of displaced people. On the one hand, it concep-
tualises the options available to individuals and 
groups as an assessment of (changing) access to  
material needs. On the other, it looks into (changing) 
chances and opportunities generated through the in-
teraction between displaced persons and individuals, 
formal and informal organisations as well as state  
authorities. Moreover, it captures the agency of dis-
placed persons within networks in the receiving 
community as well as within those reaching into the 
larger society and beyond into the transnational so-
cial realm (De Haan, 2017; Grawert & Mielke, 2018). 
The concept of the figuration of the ‘established’ 
and the ‘outsiders’ (Elias & Scotson, 1994) provides a 
useful avenue to capture livelihood-related interac-
tions in the neighbourhoods or communities that  
receive refugees. The established-outsider figuration 
points to power differentials due to differences in  
internal cohesion and degree of organisation within 
the group of the established (the receiving community) 
and the outsiders (here: the refugees settling in the 
receiving community). According to this concept, the 
presence of newcomers enhances social control 
among the group of the established and induces 
them to reinforce markers of identity, derived from 
characteristics of the role models of the perceived 
‘best’ members of their group. The newcomers tend to 
be stigmatised according to identity markers derived 
from those members of the group with the perceived 
‘lowest’ performance. The established use this differ-
ence to reserve social or political positions for their 
members, thus reinforcing their cohesion, while 
Making a living under precarious conditions
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members of the newcomers are excluded. The new-
comers identify themselves with the negative charac-
teristics allotted to their group and accept the estab-
lished as ‘better’ (Elias & Scotson, 1994). The assumed 
impact on refugees’ livelihood is their withdrawal 
from public life in the neighbourhood and from in-
teraction with the host community with the conse-
quence of missing potential livelihood options availa-
ble in the community (cf. also De Haan, 2017, pp. 6-9).
Livelihood studies hence focus on how people 
perceive life in dignity that is spent according to 
their own measures. Livelihood studies cover what 
people do to maintain their way of living and the  
capacity to act they have to make use of available  
options in a broad sense in the economic, social,  
cultural, political realms. Livelihood studies try to be 
responsive to the fact that people change and adjust 
their measure of a dignified life over time and accord-
ing to varying contexts.
Distinguishing humanitarian agencies’ livelihoods 
programming from the academic approach
Humanitarian agencies have adopted the liveli-
hood approach for displaced people and refugees 
since 2012 (UNHCR, 2012). To foster people’s resilience 
and self-reliance “throughout all phases of displace-
ment” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 3), the UNHCR has created 
guidelines for “livelihoods programming” (UNHCR, 
2015), which inform the agency’s baseline assessments 
of the refugees’ and the local population in the  
receiving communities’ socio-economic situation  
together with assessments of the local market and 
value chain analyses. Humanitarian agencies use 
this baseline to appraise the vulnerability of refugees 
and define the “targeting of livelihood programmes” 
(UNHCR, 2015, p. 7) with a perspective of several years. 
“Livelihoods partners” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 8) cooperate in 
these programmes, and “livelihoods staff” (UNHCR, 
2015, 9) receives guidance for professional work. The 
focus of the agencies’ activities for sustainable liveli-
hoods is on resilience and the market integration of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees 
through micro-credit programmes (UNHCR, 2015, p. 9).
Along the lines of the UNHCR livelihoods program-
ming, the UNHCR office in Jordan has established a 
‘livelihood working group’ consisting of most of the  
international organisations active in refugee assistance. 
The aim of the ‘provision of livelihood’ project is to  
implement “(i)mproved short term self-reliance meas-
ures in order to promote protection, human dignity 
and social cohesion in preparation for long-term eco-
nomic opportunities” (UNHCR, 2016). Under the label 
of ‘livelihood’, the activities of the agencies focus on 
the provision of basic needs and assistance for the 
most vulnerable groups. 5 The International Labour  
Organisation (ILO), which is part of the livelihood 
working group, addresses, in particular, the problem of 
employment for Syrian refugees (ILO, 2017). The organ-
isations forming the livelihood working group provide 
regularly updated data on the conditions of living and 
labour-related issues relevant for Syrian refugees, with 
a natural bias towards the registered ones.
Yet, the original intention of development agencies 
to establish an approach that focuses on people’s agency 
has given way to a highly bureaucratic and technical 
approach that inevitably tends to objectify people as 
‘target groups’. Accordingly, researchers have criticised 
development agencies’ livelihood programmes in that 
they are establishing “frameworks, toolboxes and flow 
diagrams with mechanic feedback arrows and little 
historical and theoretical depth” (Haan, 2017, pp. 3-4). 
The analytical livelihood approach applied in this Paper 
to generate knowledge on how refugees attempt to 
maintain a life in dignity, is in stark contrast to that as 
it focuses on the refugees and the context that enables 
refugees’ agency.
5 \  The livelihood provisions project includes improving  “the  ability  of  
vulnerable  households  to  meet  basic  needs  and  stabilize  household 
assets through community and municipality-based cash-for-work op-
portunities; (t)o provide short term, gender and disability sensitive live-
lihood tools and support to economically marginalized individuals; (t)o 
increase refugees’ involvement in service provision in camps through 
cash for work ensuring age, gender, and diversity mainstreaming and 
the inclusion of vulnerable groups” (UNHCR, 2016).
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Methods of field research 
The comprehensive academic livelihood ap-
proach that includes established–outsider relations 
guides the analysis of interaction and interrelation-
ships the research team was able to observe during 
their field research and which interview partners 
mentioned in their narrations. Accordingly, much of 
the research relied on observation and qualitative in-
terviews with individuals and groups that the team 
had selected through purposive as well as snowball 
sampling while applying a maximum structural  
variation of the perspective (Kleining, 1982; see list of 
interview partners at the end of this Paper). Rawan 
Alhomeimat, who holds a Master’s degree in Urban 
Planning, Habitat and International Cooperation 
from the Institute of Urbanism, Grenoble, France, and 
a Syrian student from the University of Jordan in 
Amman closely worked with the author as assistants. 
Through the contacts of the student assistant with 
Syrian refugees and support initiatives in Amman, 
the team was able to get access to a range of inform-
ants and interview partners during the intensive 
phase of field research, which took place from early 
November 2016 until the end of January 2017. The 
focus of the research on Syrians in Palestinian neigh-
bourhoods and the issue of Syrians’ response to the 
offers of the EU–Jordan Compact were developed on 
the basis of a preliminary field visit by Heidrun Bohnet. 
Findings were updated on the occasion of further  
visits of interview partners until July 2017.
The author and her assistants encouraged inter-
view partners to tell their stories starting from their 
life in Syria, their displacement and movements until 
they reached Greater Amman. Then, the team asked 
them to describe their current life, including the 
means of living (aid, support, jobs, trade, etc.), rela-
tionships they are part of within and beyond their 
families and their experiences with neighbours. The 
author's  research sites were some of the camps es-
tablished by UNRWA for Palestinian refugees that 
have developed into urban and peri-urban settle-
ments, among them mainly al-Hussayn, Hittin 
(Marka), Ain al-Basha and, for a comparison, Mafraq 
as a major receiving area for Syrian refugees in 
northern Jordan (see Map).
Among the interview partners were Syrian refu-
gees as well as Jordanian and Palestinian landlords 
and neighbours of Syrians living in areas within and 
around Amman. The study covered various social 
classes, whole and partial families, women and men 
of different generations as well as informal initiatives 
created to assist refugees in Greater Amman. The re-
search team visited some of the interview partners 
and initiatives several times and partly engaged in 
participant observation such as attending a Qur’an 
class in an Islamic centre. The team also consulted 
data and documents of the humanitarian agencies 
working with Syrian refugees in Jordan and the ILO 
as well as the relevant academic literature. The result 
of the study is a picture full of facets that deserve  
further and longer-term research on refugees’ inter-
action with their neighbours, which this Paper aims 
to stimulate. 
Map 1   
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Syria, but tried first to spend time at safer places than 
their home so that they were able to return as soon as 
possible. They were ‘internally displaced people’ 
(IDPs) in Syria for several months. When hope for  
return and opportunities of staying as IDPs in Syria 
declined, they decided to cross the border to Jordan, 
where they already had some relatives. Many inter-
view partners had similar experiences of displace-
ment within Syria until they reached Greater Amman.
Syrian refugees in Greater Amman
Most Syrian refugees who live in Greater Amman 
have been on the move since their arrival in Jordan 
in 2012 or 2013. For many, the place where they stayed 
in Amman in 2017 was still a transitional place. While 
each refugee’s story is unique, the stories have also 
much in common. The experience of destruction due 
to war, the opportunities of movement from Syria to 
Jordan, and the particular conditions of living in town 
with the status of a refugee show commonalities that 
allow us to outline some general features of the liveli-
hood of Syrian refugees in Greater Amman. Moreover, 
it has to be noted that the refugees who arrived in 
Jordan have some statistical particularities. Among 
the refugees registered by the UNHCR, more than 50 
per cent are younger than 18 years old, and there are 
slightly more women (23.5 per cent) than men (21.7 
per cent) of working age (18-59 years). 2.2 per cent of 
the refugees are women of 60 years and older, and 1.6 
per cent are older men (UNHCR, 2017b). These data 
suggest that families or partial families form a large 
part of the Syrian refugees arriving in Jordan. 6
Arriving in Jordan did not mark the beginning of 
living under precarious conditions. Most of the refu-
gees had left their homes when the war killed family 
members, when relatives died under torture in the 
regime’s prisons, or when their home was destroyed. 
The main areas of origin of the UNHCR-registered 
refugees were Deraa (41.8%), Homs (15.9%) and rural 
Damascus (11.9%) (UNHCR, 2017b). One example may 
suffice to describe the situation before arrival in 
Jordan.
They fled for political causes—the fear that the 
male family members would be recruited by the Syrian 
army or the FSA that consisted mostly of defected  
soldiers who fought on the side of the opposition 
against the Regime (nidham). 7 The course they took 
indicates that the family had no clear plan to leave 
6 \  Among the unregistered refugees, too, there are many partial families, 
mostly widows or single women with children. As statistics about un-
registered refugees are not available, this information relies on the 
insights from informal organisations engaging in voluntary assistan-
ce for refugees and on the author's  observations and interviews.
7 \  For the practice of forceful recruitment in the Syrian war, cf. also 
Zuhur (2016, p. 200).
Box 2  
Account of displacement
The family of an elderly couple interviewed originated from Duma,  
Sahet al-Ghanim near Damascus. The couple had owned two houses 
and a farm. The man had had a small laundry and was a sheep trader. 
When the war reached the village in 2012, his sheep were stolen and the 
laundry destroyed. The family hid in the basement while bombs hit 
their house. They said that it was the regime (nidham), ‘the Syrian 
army’, which did this. They saw their house and their farm go up in 
flames. They fled with four sons and three daughters. First, they moved 
to Adra, then Otaia, then Hamesh, and then still to another place. 
They were displaced again and again, staying in each place between 
two and five months. Sometimes, they paid rent; sometimes they were 
invited to stay. They were afraid that the nidham would force their 
sons or the sons-in-law to join the army or that the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) would recruit them. Two daughters had left with their husbands 
for Jordan earlier on, and the elderly couple finally followed them. They 
rented a pick-up car for US $2,500 together with other refugees and 
left the country with the whole family, except the wife’s sisters who 
remained in Syria. In early 2013, the family arrived at Zaatari camp in 
Jordan and left the camp without any problem on the same day. They 
left in two groups, because they did not have enough money for all. 
They called their nieces and spent the first days at their place in Greater 
Amman.
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Moving from the Jordanian refugee camps to  
Greater Amman—or not
Virtually all Syrian refugees who had fled to Jordan 
since mid-2012 were initially taken to the Zaatari or 
Azraq refugee camps, where most of them registered 
with UNHCR. Until July 2014, Jordan permitted refu-
gees to leave the camps and move to urban areas, but 
later only allowed them to move if sponsored by a 
close relative who met other stringent conditions 
(“bail out” according to Achilli, 2017). This process was 
suspended in early 2015 when Syrian refugees were 
granted the permission to leave the camp briefly only 
after having obtained “vacation passes” (HRW, 2018).
Syrian refugees who cannot prove that they live 
outside of camps legally are at risk of being arrested 
by the Jordanian police. Human Rights Watch  
reports that when fathers are arrested, Syrian refugee 
families may split up between the camp and town 
and start to rely on the labour force of their children 
who then drop out of school to work. Until 2016, Syrians 
living outside camps without permission were unable 
to obtain the special identification cards needed to 
apply for work permits and enrol their children in 
school. Those living outside the camps without per-
mission were also not eligible for the monthly cash 
grants UN agencies provide for the most vulnerable 
refugee families (HRW, 2018). This changed in 2016 
(see below).
Nevertheless, all interview partners in Greater 
Amman tell the research team that they try by all 
means to cut the initial stay at the camp as short as 
possible as they want to move to Jordanian towns. 
Women in particular who have fled from Syria with 
their children mostly try to leave the refugee camps 
as soon as possible after registration to join members 
of the extended family in Jordanian towns. According 
to studies conducted in the camps, poor housing and, 
in particular, the lack of privacy, is one of the main 
reasons why many Syrian families—often headed by 
women—prefer moving to towns (see for example 
Ledwith, 2014; Jabbar & Zaza, 2014). Several interview 
partners report that the situation in the camps was 
chaotic until 2013, so that it was easy for them to 
leave the camp without hindrance. Refugees arriving 
in 2014 or later tell us that they were kept at the camp 
for lengthy bureaucratic procedures and had to prove 
that they had a Jordanian citizen as a guarantor (cf. 
also Turner, 2015; Achilli, 2017). Others mention that 
they paid someone who took them out of the camp 
secretly and immediately. For this purpose, some Jor-
danians pretend to be a brother of a Syrian and direct 
them where to move, such as to Hittin camp in Am-
man, which has cheaper housing opportunities than 
many other places. 
Whereas registration by the UNHCR is the offi-
cial entrance procedure for Syrian nationals, Syrians 
with Palestinian origin are not eligible for protection 
under the UNHCR mandate. The Jordanian government 
considers them as cases to be dealt with by UNRWA, 
which takes care of Palestinians categorised as  
vulnerable groups. As Syrian Palestinians are not  
allowed to enter the common refugee camps, they 
rely on finding flats in Jordanian towns. Those dis-
covered by the Jordanian police are detained in a  
special camp called ‘Cyber City’ close to the Syrian 
border. The Jordanian government has deported some 
of these refugees (only men, who had to leave their 
families behind in Cyber City) to Syria, thus violating 
the right to protection from refoulement (HRW, 2014). 
The reason for these harsh measures is that the Jor-
danian government refuses “to solve Israel’s prob-
lems”, as Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour stated pub-
licly in 2013;  in fact, the Jordanian government fears 
that many more Palestinians will enter Jordan from 
Syria seeking protection, which the government is 
not ready to grant (ARRD, 2015). The existence of 
these refugees hence touches on the sensitivities of 
the Middle East conflict between Israel and the Arab 
states, which puts this group of refugees in a worse 
situation than the Syrian nationals.
The most common type of accommodation for 
refugee families outside the refugee camps are rented 
flats in town or the suburbs of Amman including 
those extending into neighbouring governorates 
such as Ain al-Basha in Balqa governorate. However, 
the cost of the rent, the electricity bill, the poor con-
dition of the flat (broken sanitation, dripping taps 
and leaking pipes, damp walls), and often the great 
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partners on resettlement reveals the dilemmas women 
often feel confronted with:
America is very far and a foreign country, but on the 
other hand then, we know that in the West there is 
more humanity and they respect the human being 
while here, we have no value and our rights are lost. 
We also know that education is better, and we will 
also have healthcare there. So, we may change our 
mind and reconsider the offer, if still possible. My 
sister’s daughters are in America, and they are happy 
there, and they are all learning the language, adults 
and kids (Syrian woman in al-Hussayn camp, Amman, 
January 2017).
According to several interview partners, contact 
with relatives who have been resettled to the United 
States is not guaranteed; one Syrian refugee in Amman 
explains that her family no longer communicates 
with the relatives abroad, because “they are not friends 
at all” (Syrian woman in al-Hussayn, January 2017). 
Rarely Syrians interviewed state that they receive  
assistance from resettled relatives. This attitude may 
explain partly why in 2017, only 4,989 refugees left 
Jordan for resettlement (to more than 13 countries), 
whereas in 2016, 21,000 persons (still less than five per 
cent of the Syrian refugees in Jordan) had been reset-
tled (UNHCR, 2018e). 
The following sections provide insights into the 
conditions under which the majority of refugees 
from Syria live in Greater Amman, most of them with 
the perspective of staying on until return to Syria  
becomes possible.  
Illness
The number of persons suffering from injuries 
and illnesses among the Syrian refugees is very high. 
According to the UNHCR, the number of vulnerable 
people with regard to health increased from 48 per 
cent of all (registered) refugees in 2015 to 55 per cent 
in 2017, of which five per cent were categorised as  
severely vulnerable persons (UNHCR, 2018d). Nearly 
20,000 (three per cent) of the refugees were disabled. 
The UNHCR considers nearly 30 per cent of the (regis-
tered) refugees as in need of special assistance (UNHCR, 
2017b). 
distance of the flat from areas where other relatives 
stay have made many people move from one flat to 
another. The rent for a flat with a salon, kitchen, bath-
room and two bedrooms ranged between US $210 and 
280 in 2017; the electricity bill easily reached US $70, 
as often between four and eight persons live there.
Often three generations stay together in the 
same flat; unmarried youth with families and small 
children, aunts and uncles and sometimes grand-
mother or grandfather or both. In a few cases, some 
family members managed to rent flats next door; this 
seems to be the most preferable option, in particular 
for women, because this allows them to enjoy both 
privacy and close contact with the extended family. 
Complaints concentrate on issues like the low quality 
of the buildings and still high rents to pay. There are 
no complaints about overcrowded flats. An older 
woman explained that it was possible to stay with so 
many people because the women kept wearing veils 
in the house.
Staying near Syria as a priority
Although living conditions in Jordan are difficult 
for many Syrian refugees, many do not want to join the 
UNHCR resettlement programme to a third country. 
Several interview partners report that the UNHCR 
has offered them and their whole family to join a  
resettlement programme to the United States (inter-
views in Amman and Mafraq, November 2016). The 
team's male interview partners welcome the oppor-
tunity of resettlement more than women do as they 
expect to find employment abroad. Women, however, 
tend to refuse directly and in some cases do not even 
talk to their husbands before they make this decision. 
The reasons usually are anxieties about the strange 
country and its culture, the fear of having to stay in 
an environment without Muslim neighbours and,  
in particular, fears that their daughters might be ab-
ducted and assaulted or lose the Islamic values when 
abroad (interviews with Syrian women in Amman, 
January 2017, and Mafraq, November 2016). Rumours 
influence the Syrian women, such as cases where the 
American government took the children from a 
mother because she had yelled at them and beaten 
them. The reflections of one of the team's interview 
LIVELIHOOD ANALYSIS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN GREATER AMMAN \ E. GRAWERT  
16 \ \ WORKING PAPER 4  \ 2019
discrimination and tensions with host communities” 
(Al-Rousan et al., 2018, p. 251) as the main reasons for 
health problems, thus confirming the above state-
ment of the team's Syrian interview partner on the 
causes of her husband’s depression.
During the interviews in 2016 and 2017, several 
individuals mentioned that family members needed 
surgery but that the family could not afford it. One 
woman hoped to be eligible for resettlement and get 
all the treatment needed for her grandchild for free 
in America (mother of two widowed daughters, Am-
man, 2017). A couple who had one daughter did not 
have the money to pay for surgery the wife needed to 
be able to give birth again but was content with one 
child (Syrian family in Ain al-Basha, 2016). Attitudes 
of the refugees about the entitlement to health care 
Within the team's (non-representative) sample, 
too, many interview partners complain about suffer-
ing from pain or illnesses or take care of disabled 
children and family members with chronic diseases. 
Men frequently suffer from back problems and are 
either completely unable to work or can only work for 
a limited period of time. Mental health issues among 
men are also abundant. Wives often describe their 
husbands as depressed. The statement of one woman 
is representative for many others as it shows what 
this implies for the family. Her husband is “very de-
pressed; he doesn’t want to get out of the room or see 
anyone; he is always very angry, because he cannot 
work and feels discriminated against” (interview 
with a female Syrian refugee in al-Hussayn camp, 
November 2016). These accounts show that illnesses 
among the refugees are a result of their living condi-
tions, which include the difficulties of finding em-
ployment and work as well as discrimination by 
neighbours (see the section on neighbourhood rela-
tions for details). One more example will suffice to 
shed light on the effects of illness or injury on Syrian 
refugee families (see Box 3).
The example shows that in cases where a man is 
unable to work due to an injury, the wife tries to care 
for the family by seeking a cheap flat, applying for 
food vouchers from the UNHCR, starting a home 
business, and in addition, using all means to get sup-
port from relatives and sponsors to pay for medical 
treatment. Complications requiring surgeries bring a 
household to its edge; Syrian refugees increasingly 
are unable to cover the costs as their displacement 
becomes protracted and they have used up their 
savings.  
Between 2012 and 2014, Syrian refugees benefitted 
from a special policy of the Jordanian government 
that provided free health care to the newcomers. In 
the following years, the government included Syrian 
refugees in the subsidies that uninsured Jordanians 
enjoy (HRW, 2018). A study from 2015 that focused on 
the perceptions of Syrian refugees of health provision 
in Jordan found that most of the refugees considered 
the costs to be the primary constraint to health care 
access. The interview partners in that study identi-
fied “(p)erceived unfair aid distribution, 
Box 3  
Effects of injury on a refugee family
A Syrian refugee family that lives in Hittin camp is struggling with 
deteriorating living conditions. After having completed her high school 
exam, the mother worked in a private company for storage security in 
Homs, Syria, while her husband was employed at a restaurant and later 
at a vegetable shop. Her husband was injured when a bomb dropped on 
the shop. They left their home, and learned that soon after, their house 
was also hit by a bomb. The family arrived in Jordan in 2014. Since 
then, the mother has been caring for her husband and looking after the 
two small children who were both born in Jordan. UNHCR post-natal 
support to women had already been discontinued when she gave birth. 
Her husband’s leg injury from the bomb attack in Syria prevents him 
from working as the wound was not healing after some surgery funded 
by a French agency and performed in a nearby hospital. The mother has 
not been able to source any funding for more surgery so far, which will 
cost JOD 3,500 (US $4,900). He will continue to need further 
treatment.
The family receives food vouchers from UNHCR. In 2016, they received 
some support for paying the rent, but this has stopped. They have used 
up the money they came with and are currently receiving some support 
from her brother, who has a job in Irbid. They also receive donations 
from persons who help people in need, whom the woman does not know. 
One of her sisters fled to Germany and is now trying to invite the family, 
as a resettlement could make treatment of the injury possible. Currently, 
the woman is planning to start training as a seamstress in Marka, the 
quarter to which Hittin camp belongs. She is looking forward to work-
ing from home (interview with a refugee woman from Syria in Hittin, 
January 2017).
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access to aid and education. On the other hand, the 
closure of subsidies for health care will affect the  
majority of Syrian refugees who depend on support 
to get necessary medical treatment.
Two-thirds of the Jordanian population are cov-
ered by health insurance. In Amman, the percentage 
of insured Jordanians is lower (50.2 per cent) than in 
all other governorates, whereas the percentage of Jor-
danians with health insurance in Balqa governorate 
is the highest (76 per cent) (Ghazal, 2016). The reason 
for this difference is probably related to the fact that 
a large number of Palestinian–Jordanians live in Am-
man. Lower class Jordanians either depend on dona-
tions or, if they are lucky, get access to government 
services, which they cannot rely on as they are not 
legally binding. Palestinian–Jordanians who are cate-
gorised as vulnerable people are supposed to receive as-
sistance from UNRWA in those quarters of Amman that 
are still called ‘camps’. UNRWA receives donations 
from the Arab and Turkish governments as well as 
donations from private sponsors (UNRWA, 2018). The 
Royal Court of Jordan also has its own support 
scheme:
that goes beyond the very basic needs vary between 
different families, ranging from very modest to high 
expectations and anger about not being treated ac-
cording to the expected level.
In 2018, the Jordanian government revoked the 
eligibility for subsidised health care for Syrian refu-
gees who lived outside refugee camps. The new policy 
requires Syrian refugees to pay 80 per cent of the rate 
for health care like any other foreigner in Jordan 
(UNHCR, 2018e). At public hospitals, 80 per cent of the 
costs for treatment have to be paid up-front (HRW, 
2018). The increase in fees for services for Syrian refu-
gees amounts to twice to five times the former rate. 
Although not an illness, giving birth has become very 
expensive in hospitals with the charge rising from 
JOD 60 (US $85) before the policy change to JOD 240 
(US $338) in 2018 (Dunmore & Sakkab, 2018). 
This statement points to a huge discrepancy in 
Jordanian policies introduced in 2018. On the one 
hand, the status regularisation of Syrian refugees out-
side camps may increase options for legal employment, 
Box 4  
Impact of the abolishment of medical subsidies for Syrian 
refugees
According to a survey of the United Nations Children’s Emergency 
Fund (UNICEF), three-quarters of Syrian household members who are 
unable to get medicine or care for chronic illnesses state that they can-
not afford the costs. The survey further establishes that 45 per cent of 
the Syrian children under the age of six do not receive necessary health 
care such as vaccinations (HRW, 2018). The majority of registered  
Syrian refugees already spent 40 to 45 per cent of their income on medi-
cines and medical treatment when the subsidies of 2016/17 were still in 
place (IRC, 2018). The UNHCR warns that the cost of transport and 
other barriers to public health services may induce Syrian refugees to 
buy drugs at the market without a medical diagnosis and to deliver at 
home (UNHCR, 2018e). Bill Van Esveld, a children’s rights researcher 
at Human Rights Watch, points out that “(t)he move to regularize the 
status of Syrian refugees in Jordan’s urban areas means that they no 
longer have to live underground, promising a better future for their 
children … Jordan and its international donors should not undermine 
these improvements by pulling the rug out from under refugees on 
health care that families are already struggling to afford” (HRW, 
2018).
Box 5  
Aid by UNRWA vs aid by the Royal Court of Jordan
According to an elderly Palestinian refugee living in al-Hussayn camp, 
the Jordanian Royal Hashemite Court provides the local hospital with 
medical supplies. There, the interview partner receives standard drugs 
for free. He only has to pay for special medication, which costs JOD 25 
(US $35) per month. He is not eligible for assistance by UNRWA (not 
categorised as vulnerable). He stresses that he prefers the help he can 
obtain through the Royal Court, because it includes the costs for stay-
ing in hospital whereas UNRWA only provides medicine. He tells us 
that some time ago, UNRWA used to distribute food packages contain-
ing sugar and flour to his family, but they no longer do so. The man 
believes that to avoid aid dependence, assistance through the Royal 
Court is better than through UNRWA. Moreover, he emphasises that 
he favours a general social system that supports the elderly and the 
poor (interview, January 2017).
Hence, in the Palestinian communities that host 
Syrian refugees, many inhabitants do not have better 
access to health services than the refugees from Syria 
among them.
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working children. Achilli (2017) stresses that this vio-
lates children’s rights severely but is very difficult to 
deal with because of the irregular status of their 
families.
According to the Islamic culture, Muslims should 
preferentially donate to widows and orphans to pro-
tect them from poverty. However, this culture can be 
abused, as the example below reveals:
Poverty
According to UNHCR figures, 80 per cent of all 
registered refugees live off less than three US dollars 
per day (Dunmore, 2018); 85 per cent of the refugees 
staying outside the refugee camps live below the  
national poverty line of Jordan (UNHCR, 2018e). 
In 2015, Jordan became the first country where 
the UNHCR used the iris scan technology for the 
identification of refugees eligible for monthly assis-
tance in cash, a safe method to prevent fraud or double 
receipts of payments for refugees staying outside 
camps in towns (Dunmore, 2015). Besides 100,000  
refugees inside the camps, 30,000 Syrian refugees 
outside the camps received cash assistance in 2018 
(UNHCR, 2018b, e). The UNHCR also provides monthly 
food vouchers (value of JOD 120; US $169) and medicine 
(value up to JOD 125; US $176), in particular to those 
with chronic illnesses. During the interviews, several 
Syrian refugees complained that the UNHCR did not 
recognise them as poor and refused to include them 
in the category of refugees who are identified 
through iris scan and eligible for cash assistance.
Poverty means that refugees, in particular the  
elderly and women with children, deliberately try to 
eat little to save costs. It also means saving on gas 
heating so that they either huddle under blankets or 
use one single gas heater around which the whole 
family gathers together. Small children sometimes 
faint from breathing in the gas. Illnesses—even of 
children—are not immediately treated, or treatment 
is even abandoned because the families cannot afford 
it (authors’ observations in houses of refugees in  
Amman and Mafraq, 2016). 
Poverty forces refugee families to send their chil-
dren to work and agree to child marriages, which 
leads to them dropping out of school. Child labour 
can have severe consequences for families that are 
staying as undocumented refugees outside the refu-
gee camps. When the Jordanian police arrests the 
children, they cannot be reunified with their parents 
as the children will not tell where they live. A study 
by Achilli (2017) on undocumented families reveals 
that forced encampment and even deportation of  
minors to Syria increasingly follow after the arrest of 
Box 6  
Abuse of widows and orphans
A family with two widowed daughters and several orphans staying in 
al-Hussayn camp receives occasional visitors, who come because they 
want to help orphans. The visitors claim to know about the family 
from other people or through orphanage centres. The mother reports 
that people keep telling her and her daughters that they are lucky be-
cause they have orphans; this means that they will receive much more 
assistance. In fact, the family has been able to move into an apartment 
in al-Hussayn and pay the rent of JOD 200 (US $281), as part of the 
cost is covered by benefactors who promised that they would pay the 
rent for one year. The benefactors wanted to help them because there 
are four orphans in the house. 
The visitors intending to donate to widows and orphans are often men 
from different backgrounds—Syrians, Jordanian–Palestinians and Jor-
danians. Some of them said that they intended to sponsor the orphans, 
but then started to ask their mothers out or immediately proposed to 
marry them, although all these men were already married and mostly 
old. When the young mothers refused, the visitors stopped coming and 
donating. Some men would ring them up at night and tell them that 
they will help the orphans and then start talking dirty. The daughters 
always refused and hung up the phone. Once a woman from al-Aboura 
centre (an Islamic centre in the neighbourhood) called the young wom-
en and tried to persuade them to enter into an arranged marriage. 
However, the young mothers had received the information that the 
woman would be paid by the groom-to-be if they accepted the offer and 
refused the deal. 
One of the young women reports that even the doctor who had agreed 
on the surgery for her father asked her out. She believed that this is 
why the family has not heard from him again about the surgery ap-
pointment for one-and-a-half months (interview in al-Hussayn, Janu-
ary 2017). 
The young widows managed to reject the men with the support of their 
mother and keep their dignity despite their need of money—at least for 
the time being.     
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welfare system also does not reach poor, unemployed 
or informally hired Jordanians in need. The Jordanian 
Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD), 
was established as a charity organisation for poor 
Jordanians as early as in 1977. JOHUD has close con-
nections to the Jordanian government and operates 
alongside various ministries towards implementing 
the government’s development plans (JOHUD, 2018). 
Since 2013, the agency has extended its assistance be-
yond poor Jordanians and included Syrian refugees. 
This organisation is presented here in some detail to 
provide insights into the response of Jordanian insti-
tutions to the needs of Syrian refugees. 
In another case, a young refugee whose two chil-
dren were sick and whose husband was working dur-
ing the day, mentioned a similar behaviour of men. In 
urgent need of money, she agreed to have extra-mari-
tal sex, but felt exploited and desperate at the same 
time (interview in al-Hussayn, January 2017). Young 
female refugees are thus under massive pressure to 
protect and defend themselves against sexual as-
saults by men. The men in these examples ignore the 
cultural rules of proposing for marriage, which would 
require the involvement of the parents and further 
relatives, negotiations about a bride price and, hence, 
meetings between the families of groom and bride, if 
meant seriously. Their behaviour reveals a high de-
gree of discrimination of the Syrian women, implying 
that as refugees they are weak and poor and hence, 
easy and cheap victims that can be abused. The ac-
counts reveal that female refugees, in particular wid-
ows, are weakened as the protection through estab-
lished family structures is lacking and legal 
protection is almost non-existent.
Adjustments by a Jordanian aid and development 
organisation to the mass arrival of refugees
Social protection in Jordan comprises subsidies, 
cash transfer schemes, tax exemptions and social 
services. 8 The public social welfare system in Jordan 
applies only to Jordanian employees and is based on 
monthly contributions of 5.5 per cent of salaries from 
each the employer and the employee. Foreigners and 
refugees are excluded; however, the Jordanian social 
8 \  According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Jordan’s 
social security system consists of four major programmes targeting 
different social groups. 
\  “a public social insurance programme administered by the Social 
Security Corporation (SSC), which covers all workers subject to the 
rules of the Labour Law regardless of their sex or nationalities ranging 
between 16 and 60 years old for males and 16 and 55 for females, as well 
as public employees not subject to civil or military retirement law, and 
Jordanians employed at foreign political, military or international 
mission in Jordan; 
\  a public program for the civil service and military which is currently 
being phased out; 
\  a publicly funded social assistance programme through the National 
Aid Fund (NAF); 
\  an assistance programme for Palestinian refugees delivered through 
the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).” (ILO, 2017a).  
The increasing resort to self-organised social assistance among Jor-
danians has been studied by Baylouny (2010), a deeper discussion of 
which will be beyond the scope of this Paper. 
Box 7  
JOHUD
JOHUD has a large office in a multi-organisation building, which is 
protected by security officers at each entrance. Big framed photos of 
King Abdullah and King Hussein are hanging on the wall like in any 
government office. According to the human resources manager, JOHUD 
is “the biggest and oldest Jordanian NGO, … currently running 51  
development centres all over Jordan and employing over 800 persons in 
total” (interview in November, 2016). According to JOHUD’s homepage, 
2,500 volunteers work in partnership with the organisation (JOHUD, 
2018a). Princess Basma bint al-Hussayn is the chair of JOHUD’s 
board of trustees. Obviously, JOHUD is a government-organised non- 
governmental organisation (NGO), which is a typical phenomenon in 
countries with a public sector-dominated economy (Brown & Korten, 
1989).
JOHUD operates in the fields of poverty alleviation, empowerment of 
women and community development, targeting less fortunate Jordanians. 
The manager emphasises that Palestinians are well integrated in the 
Jordanian society and maintains that there are no more Palestinian 
refugees in Jordan as they all received a Jordanian passport and have 
become part of the social tissue. 1 They are included in JOHUD’s projects 
like any other disadvantaged Jordanian. More recently, Syrian refugees 
have also been covered by JOHUD’s projects (cf. JOHUD, 2018). The 
manager claims that in contrast to Palestinian–Jordanians, tensions 
have occurred between Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities, 
predominantly in Mafraq province, since 2012 (cf. also MerciCorps, 2012). 
1 \  This is a personal view of the interview partner and does not reflect 
the difficult legal status of Palestinian–Jordanians (for details, see 
Annex II).
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A closer look at the tensions between marginalised 
Jordanians and Syrian refugees in Mafraq is justified 
here as it provides insights not only into the relation-
ship between refugees and host communities but 
also into responses of the Jordanian extended social 
welfare system. According to the human resources 
manager, JOHUD was one of the first NGOs to notice 
these tensions that started in Mafraq, an area where 
high numbers of poor Jordanians had been living  
already before the Syrian crisis started and the  
province where the largest refugee camp al-Zaatari 
received Syrians crossing the border. 9
As Syrians started to become part of Jordanian 
communities in many parts of Jordan, JOHUD gave 
up its focus on assisting solely poor Jordanians. Since 
2013, it has included Syrians in their projects making 
sure that at least 50 per cent of the beneficiaries still 
are Jordanians. JOHUD has never worked in projects 
dedicated only to Syrians and never in the Syrian 
camps (human resource manager of JOHUD, Amman, 
November 2016). 
The repercussions of the Syrian crisis have led to 
significant changes for JOHUD. Earlier on, the organ-
isation had received basic funding by the Jordanian 
government and raised additional funds from various 
donors. In 2013, the Jordanian government stopped 
subsidising JOHUD. Since then, the organisation has 
been relying on fundraising for its ongoing assis-
tance of Jordanians who are living below the poverty 
line with initial capital to start small projects. JOHUD 
is competing with other local organisations in getting 
project proposals approved by international donors, 
which provide funding for limited periods of time. 
Currently, JOHUD is working as implementing organ-
isation for the World Food Programme in training 
young Jordanians in poverty pockets, for the UNHCR 
in women empowerment projects for Jordanians and 
Syrians, and for UNICEF targeting both Jordanian 
and Syrian children. In cooperation with the German 
development agency GIZ, JOHUD runs a project reha-
bilitating water supply and sewage for Syrians and 
Jordanians in Irbid (human resource manager of JO-
HUD, Amman, November 2016; cf. also JOHUD, 2018; 
9 \  The population of Mafraq province more than doubled between 2012 
and 2015, due to incoming refugees from Syria (Malkawi, 2015).
Box 8  
Tensions between Jordanian inhabitants and Syrian  
refugees in Mafraq 
The local JOHUD team witnessed increasing grievances among mar-
ginalised Jordanians about the quantity of aid that international  
organisations distributed to the refugees at the beginning of the crisis. 
Poor Jordanians who were no better off than the Syrian refugees were 
not considered. Moreover, as Syrians began to sell the food packages 
they had received as in-kind aid on the black market of Mafraq, the 
small grocery shops run and frequented by Jordanians were not able to 
compete with the cheap food appearing on the market and made losses. 
Furthermore, growing numbers of Jordanians had to leave their apart-
ments in Mafraq, because of rising rents that they could no longer  
afford as an effect of rent subsidies from UNHCR for Syrians. 1 Further 
repercussions of the mass settlement of refugees in Mafraq and the 
subsequent impoverishment of Jordanians were visible in changed  
livelihood strategies. Reportedly, some Jordanians started to work in 
blue-collar and casual jobs (that usually are taken by migrants).  
Allegedly a Jordanian mother told the manager of JOHUD that “he 
shouldn’t be shocked if he sees her daughters getting out of a stranger’s 
car from the Gulf” (interview in Amman, November 2016), indicating 
that poverty has become so severe that Jordanian girls are driven into 
prostitution. According to the manager of JOHUD, “the culture of 
shame has faded dramatically after the arrival of Syrians … Things 
have changed a lot. New houses for prostitution have emerged—a  
crucial indicator of change because people at Mafraq used to be very 
conservative.”According to the manager, JOHUD immediately informed 
the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the rising grievances and ad-
verse developments following the mass influx of Syrian refugees into 
Mafraq province. They suggested to the ministries to implement a sim-
ilar policy as the Jordanian government had used towards Iraqi refu-
gees, which had obliged donors to allot a share of 25 per cent of any as-
sistance for refugees to less fortunate members of the Jordanian host 
communities. The Jordanian government adopted this policy for com-
munities that received Syrian refugees soon after this request (cf. also 
JOHUD, 2018). However, according to the JOHUD human resources 
manager, a share of 25 per cent of the incoming aid funds is not suffi-
cient to support the poor Jordanians and compensate them for the 
hardships they suffer because of the mass influx of Syrian refugees (in-
terview with the human resource manager of JOHUND, Amman, No-
vember 2016). 
1 \  This was confirmed by a Jordanian pastor whom the author consulted in  
Mafraq in November 2016 and by Ann-Christin Wagner, who did her 
PhD research in Mafraq (oral communication in November, 2016).
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irregular and expensive ways to reach Amman with-
out a guarantor, such as using their savings (if they 
have any) to pay Jordanians to pretend to be a relative. 
Syrians who arrive in Jordan empty-handed do not 
have this option and either stay in the camps or 
choose a life as irregular persons with all the risks of 
being arrested, encamped or deported. A priority for 
the refugee families interviewed in Amman has been 
privacy—which is a matter of preserving their dignity, 
especially for women—, which they seek to achieve by 
staying with their core or extended family in rented 
flats, be it legally or as undocumented persons.
Housing was affordable at the beginning of the 
refugee influx. Over the years, rents have increased 
even for flats that are in bad shape, in particular in 
overcrowded Mafraq, but in other areas of Jordan as 
well including Greater Amman. Syrian refugees take 
action by moving to different flats and trying their 
best to join other family members, thus laying the 
ground for better opportunities of keeping their own 
culture and identity under adverse conditions in a 
foreign country.
Illness, particularly when it affects the men,  
appears to be a nearly insurmountable problem for 
many families, as it prevents the men from taking 
the initiative and deprives them of own agency. 
Illness also seems to be inextricably linked to the 
traumas of the war and the banishment of Syrians 
from employment in the jobs that they had been 
trained to do before. Under these conditions, women 
have to take over small service jobs that they can do 
from home and to go out and ask relatives for help—
who may still be in Syria or abroad as part the family’s 
trans-local network. Women also ask for help in the 
neighbourhood, from informal aid initiatives, and 
sometimes, humanitarian agencies. The activities 
pursued by most of the interviewed refugees indicate 
a strong desire to keep going by adhering as closely 
as possible to the ways they know from home.
Being a refugee, losing husbands and family 
members in the war and being forced to take respon-
sibility for families on their own are conditions that 
throw many Syrian women into poverty. They try to 
keep their dignity and a way of life that resembles at 
2016). This indicates that a reliance on international 
aid has replaced state subsidies for this NGO in the 
context of the mass arrival of Syrian refugees and in-
creased international funding. Moreover, the case of 
JOHUD shows that they were no longer able to focus 
on charity for poor Jordanians only given that the 
newcomers deeply affected the livelihood of the local 
population, which has been most outstanding in 
Mafraq.
Different from Mafraq province, JOHUD staff 
members operating in the three community develop-
ment centres in Amman have not observed any ten-
sions between Syrians and Jordanians in Amman,  
although competition in the labour market has been 
strong in the urban areas. According to the human 
resource manager of JOHUD, Syrians have merged 
into the society of the city as they used to live in Amman 
even before the Syrian crisis (Amman, November 2016). 
This observation must be verified and, if this is true, 
further explained. The section on neighbourhood 
relations below will do this.
Livelihood-related agency of the refugees
The sections above show that Syrian refugees are 
subject to numerous legal and social constraints. 
Those who are poor or sick depend on aid and, hence, 
on the decisions about their treatment (including se-
lection for resettlement) by the UNHCR and local hu-
manitarian and development agencies. However, the 
refugees also make their own decisions and act inde-
pendently, first and foremost by leaving the refugee 
camps in high numbers. These actions indicate some 
capacity to act (‘agency’) towards self-determined 
ends, despite adverse conditions. 
Initially, when the camps were still being set up, 
leaving the camps required finding ‘traffickers’ who 
helped the refugees to circumvent camp bureaucracy 
and make their way to Amman. Later on and still to-
day, Syrian refugees who have relatives in Jordan can 
be bailed out through a guarantor. Trans-local family 
networks thus open up more livelihood options that 
they can use through their own agency. Many Syrian 
refugees, however, do not have such networks. Hence, 
they face more difficulties and are forced to use 
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least faintly the livelihood they used to have in Syria. 
However, there is a fine line between managing life 
in poverty and making decisions out of desperation, 
which can force a mother to earn money by selling 
her body—with or without (forced) marriage—to have 
the means to care for herself and her children. The 
horrifying experience of war in Syria, the displace-
ment and continuous movement from flat to flat in 
Jordan, the attempts to adjust to the new environment 
in Greater Amman and the illnesses in the family all 
influence women’s attitudes. The mother interviewed 
in al-Hussayn camp (see Box 6) is convinced that 
marrying at a young age (13 and 15), as it has been 
common in many parts of Syria, will become less  
frequent in the future. Women have become more 
self-confident and are no longer prepared to submit 
to men who want to control them. The agency of 
these women is characterised by steadfastness  
towards the approaches of men, offers of money,  
marriage and donations, in order to preserve their 
self-esteem.
Refusing offers for resettlement is a way of secur-
ing a way of life that is still close to the livelihood 
people had in Syria. Women, in particular, hesitate to 
leave Jordan despite poor living conditions to stay 
close to Syria so that they may return as soon as the 
violence subsides. The option of resettlement, however, 
appears to be a solution for women in families with 
ill members, mainly because treatment is expensive 
in Jordan and they expect cheaper medical care in 
Western countries. Men are in a genuine dilemma as 
they suffer because they have lost their role as bread-
winner for the family and hence, a crucial component 
of what they consider life in dignity. It is for this rea-
son that they would agree more easily than women to 
resettlement, hoping to have a better opportunity to 
return to the role that is expected of a man.
As a whole, the section has shown that the family 
is the crucial unit around which refugees from Syria 
build their livelihood. They embrace or refuse available 
options having the well-being of spouses and children 
as well as parts of the extended family in mind. To gain 
a more comprehensive understanding of the ways 
refugees from Syria cope with protracted displace-
ment in Greater Amman, the author will examine 
how these options are affected within neighbour-
hoods of former Palestinian refugees in the 
following. 
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Neighbours
Ain al-Basha is a small middle-class town in the 
periphery of Amman where extended Jordanian fam-
ilies have lived for a long time and owned the land. 
This peri-suburban neighbourhood is located close to 
a Palestinian camp and therefore inhabited by native 
Jordanians as well as Jordanians with Palestinian  
origin that have managed to acquire some wealth. 
Some of those Palestinians who got the Jordanian 
citizenship through a ‘yellow passport’ 10 migrated to 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries and invested 
their income in a house in Ain al-Basha. Some rent 
out flats, often to Syrian refugees. Most of the Syrian 
refugees interviewed in Ain al-Bash consider their 
neighbourhood as kind and helpful; Jordanian land-
lords with Palestinian origin have been welcoming 
and supportive to the refugees. As the majority of ref-
ugees in this neighbourhood came from rural areas 
in Syria and was used to living in large houses and 
own land, it is still hard for them to adapt to the 
cramped conditions. 
In contrast to a middle-class area like Ain al-Basha, 
Hittin camp in Marka, a suburb of Amman, had con-
sisted of tents in the 1950s like all other Palestinian 
refugee camps and has gradually become a low-class 
quarter of Amman inhabited mainly by Palestinian 
refugees and their offspring. UNRWA is in charge of 
the camp, and government regulations are not valid 
as long as UNRWA takes care of the settlement. Traders 
have negotiated special contracts with UNRWA so 
that they can turn part of their houses into shops. 
Some of the camp inhabitants rent out flats to Syrians. 
A local trader says, “people do everything under UNRWA, 
but the land will belong to the government when 
they leave for Palestine …”, indicating the temporary 
status of Palestinians living in Jordan, which has 
lasted for 70 years already (more explanations in  
Annex II). The mountain site across the road passing 
Hittin camp does not belong to the UNRWA-con-
trolled camp, but to private owners. Many new houses 
are being constructed there because the influx of  
 
10 \  Those who originated from the West Bank but stayed within Jordan. 
For more information on the passport system see Annex II.
Many Syrian refugees have found flats in the  
Palestinian ‘camps’—quarters of Amman like 
al-Hussayn camp or in the surrounding governorates 
like Ain al-Basha. However, as they have no income 
and often depend on UNHCR food vouchers, many of 
them are indebted to previous or current landlords, 
who often live in the same house. According to several 
interview partners, landlords and landladies will be 
patient and understanding when the Syrian refugees 
cannot pay the rent and let them pay it in very small 
instalments even after they have moved out. This holds 
true for landlords and landladies from any origin—
Palestinian, Jordanian or Iraqi. Some Palestinian–Jor-
danians and Iraqi owners of apartments only rent to 
Syrians (interviews with Syrian tenants and Palestinian–
Jordanian landlords in Ain al-Basha and Hittin,  
November 2016 and January 2017). 
Whereas Syrian respondents consider this as an 
act of friendliness, in fact, they are a potential gold-
mine for landlords. The UNHCR and other interna-
tional humanitarian agencies paid the rents for 
many Syrian refugees outside camps for an initial  
period of six months, which became an incentive for 
landlords to increase the rents. Consequently, Syrian 
families plunged into a debt trap when UNHCR sub-
sidies stopped and they were no longer to afford the 
rent. This has not only occurred in Mafraq in northern 
Jordan, where the number of inhabitants doubled 
due to the influx of Syrian refugees (Bank, 2016), but 
also in Greater Amman. 
Many Syrian refugees have moved to al-Hussayn as 
well as other Palestinian former camps, for example, 
in al-Zarqa governorate, to join relatives who already 
live there. Among the refugees from Syria, there is a 
tendency not to interact much with one’s neighbours, 
no matter whether they are also Syrians, Iraqis or  
Jordanians. Syrian interview partners report that 
they do not trust them and that they prefer to spend 
their time with their already extended family. The 
following sections provide insights into the refugees’ 
perception of their neighbours and vice versa.
Neighbourhood relations between Syrian refugees 
and Jordanian–Palestinians
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not demand more. More or less implicitly, these two 
host community representatives consider the standard 
of living of Syrians and their attempts to maintain it 
not appropriate compared with the living standard of 
the host community. 
Syrians promises high profits for landlords who rent 
out flats to them. Within Hittin, however, Syrians 
with very low income stay in small and simple flats 
rented out by Palestinian–Jordanian landlords, as the 
example in Box 9 shows. 
This example is typical for Syrian families stay-
ing in the Palestinian camps. They are absorbed with 
their own affairs and problems and mostly relate to 
their family, not to the neighbourhood. The only  
attractive place to visit besides regular shopping with 
food vouchers is the nearby Islamic centre. However, 
the local population increasingly perceives Syrians as 
a problem, as the example, also from Hittin camp, 
shows. (see Box 10)
These members of the host community perceive 
strong differences between themselves and the new-
comers in terms of (assumed) wealth, support (which 
they consider as unfair as needy Jordanians do not 
get it), and culture (making noise at night). They dis-
like the increased competition in the labour and 
housing markets as conditions are unequal and  
(Palestinian–) Jordanians at a disadvantage. At the 
same time, in fulfilment of their religious obligations, 
they give donations to the refugees. From their per-
spective, this should suffice, and the Syrians should 
Box 10  
Two Palestinian traders' perception of Syrian refugees 
A jeweller’s whose parents had fled from Palestine in 1948 and an owner 
of a shoe shop who introduces himself as a Jordanian emphasise that 
“nothing should be put between Jordanians and Palestinians”. They 
consider the Syrian refugees as competitors as they work for low wages. 
According to them, many shop owners in Hittin camp employ Syrians, 
but the two interview partners do not, although Syrians have asked 
them for a job. One of the men has three Jordanian employees who have 
worked for him for a long time. He says: “Yes, the Syrians compete for 
jobs and also get aid ... therefore, it is right when they get low wages.” 
The other one adds: “The Syrians buy gold. They live much better than 
the Palestinians. They have gold and better housing. When they came, 
they first asked to rent an apartment, then for work”. He adds, “at 
night, the Syrians make a lot of noise”. The first one mentions that 
“Syrians got water heaters and everything in their houses. Palestinians 
cannot afford those things”. The second one tells us that he has helped 
Syrians to find a flat and states that “their situation has always been 
good. Jordanian charity organisations have helped them”. Both shop 
owners donate money to Syrians through charity organisations and 
explain that it is part of zakat (Islamic tax for helping the poor). One 
of them states that “Jordan provides a place of safety, also for Syrians. 
There are equal laws, and there is no discrimination. There are charity 
organisations for the poor”.
Both traders’ businesses are doing well, but one of them says: “Jordanians’ 
living conditions are not good, and they do not get support, but the  
international organisations provide a good living to Yemenites, Iraqis 
– it should also be like that for Jordanians. The Iraqis came with a lot 
of money and still got aid.” The two men agree that “the Syrians should 
not be allowed to work”. Then they address the issue of increasing 
rents, which have tripled within a short time. One of the men says: 
“The rent is JOD 150 (US $211) instead of JOD 50 (US $70) before. The 
Syrian neighbours are able to pay JOD 300 (US $422). If you want an 
apartment, the landlords will prefer Syrians. They have money through 
the UNHCR and can be kicked out easily. This is very convenient for 
landlords. Some landlords divide the flats and rent them out to two 
Syrian families. Some former tenants moved out by themselves, others 
were asked to leave, and Syrian tenants moved in”. The other one con-
firms that “private persons benefit from the Syrian tenants. The land-
lords benefit. Poor people are forced to pay much higher rents.”
Box 9  
Low-cost housing and privacy  
A Syrian family who had arrived from Homs in 2014 has just recently 
moved to a new flat in Hittin camp, because the rent of their previous 
flat was increased from JOD 85 (US $119) to JOD 100 (US $141),  
although it had no windows. The family has to pay JOD 90 (US $126) 
plus fees for water and electricity for the new flat, which the woman 
considers as “healthy”, because it has windows. 
The woman, who cares for her injured husband and two small children, 
has some relationships with other Syrian women in the neighbourhood, 
but not with Palestinians. She wants to visit the Islamic centre nearby. 
Her husband has two brothers who stay in Marka, the suburb within 
which Hittin camp is located. The woman feels comfortable in the new 
neighbourhood as everybody minds their own business. The main prob-
lems are the rising rents and transport expenses (interview with a  
Syrian woman in Hittin, January 2017).
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to the host community and feel obliged to keep their 
suffering to themselves so that they do not cause  
severe trouble within the community or for their 
own family.
The precarious living conditions of Jordanians 
with Palestinian origin who have experienced barri-
ers to the Jordanian labour market and suffered from 
their permanent exile situation have led to mixed 
feelings towards the Syrian newcomers. The original 
residents of the camp express ambiguous attitudes 
towards the refugees and believe that they do not  
belong to the community. These attitudes include 
welcoming and empathic feelings as well as suspicions 
that the Syrians might not be as needy as they pre-
tend; in fact, they might be in a better situation than 
the host community, as the statement in Box 12 
reveals.
This example reveals a clear established–outsider 
figuration in which Jordanian and Palestinian mem-
bers of the host community perceive themselves as 
one group of ‘good people’ that defends its position 
against the outsiders that they perceive as having 
bad habits. The figuration contains a further element, 
palpable in the blame the camp inhabitants place on 
the profiteering landlords. The increased demand for 
flats by Syrian refugees has brought to light the local 
class differences that intersect with the differences 
between Jordanians, who own land, and Palestinians, 
who do not. How the influx of the Syrian refugees  
enhances pre-existing tensions also becomes visible 
in al-Hussayn camp.
Many Palestinian refugees have settled in al- 
Hussayn ‘camp’ in Amman; some have been staying 
there since the early 1960s. At that time, there were 
neither streets nor water or sewage system. Nowadays, 
al-Hussayn is an ordinary lower- to middle-class 
housing area like many other quarters in Amman.  
According to a long-term inhabitant, mainly Palestin-
ians and many Egyptian workers, Filipinos, Sudanese 
and Iraqis live there, but very few Jordanians who do 
not have a Palestinian background.  Most Jordanians 
of Palestinian origin received their houses from the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 
and do not have to pay rent. Typical occupations of 
Palestinian–Jordanians are jobs as drivers, labourers, 
retail traders or mechanics; many are working infor-
mally. Many of them live in the UNRWA-run settle-
ments (‘camps’) and have relatives in different other 
‘camps’ in Greater Amman. The following examples 
from the interviews shed light on the neighbourhood 
relations between Syrian refugees and Palestinian–
Jordanian hosts.
The Syrian women tell the interviewer that they 
feel like outsiders in al-Hussayn camp. They describe 
it as a status that cannot be hidden and exposes 
them to different treatment by the local population. 
Both the positive experiences of getting help and the 
negative incidences of being harassed make them 
feel constrained in taking any action they consider 
appropriate. They also feel guilty of causing higher 
rents. In short, they regard themselves as a burden  
Box 11  
Two female refugees’ perception of neighbourhood relations 
Asked about her contacts in the neighbourhood, a Syrian woman living 
in al-Hussayn camp reports that when she does not have the money to 
buy medicine, a pharmacist who is close by helps her for free. Her 
mother adds that “we know that we Syrians are causing a lot of trouble 
here, we made the rent high while people are already poor here. We feel 
that they are right when they accuse us of the deterioration of condi-
tions, but it was not our choice and we also have no voice here”. She 
continues that people at the market sometimes sexually harass her and 
her daughters and that some say very bad words about Syrians in gen-
eral when they see them. Both women claim that they are recognised as 
Syrians because they wear the veil differently compared to the local 
women and that they also wear more black clothes than the others. 
Moreover, the local people know that they are Syrians when they speak 
because of their accent. The young woman adds that there is a particu-
lar person that keeps harassing her very rudely. He has a shop near 
their house. To avoid him, she says: “I now change my way home, and 
my sisters and mother do the same. The whole neighbourhood knows 
this man and avoids him. I often imagine that I let his wife or mother 
know about his acts. However, I do not want any problems with him, 
because if my father or brother knows that he annoys me, they will 
fight with him, and the other man is evil and might hurt them. I just 
don’t want to cause any trouble” (interview in al-Hussayn, January 
2017).
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The elderly man’s views are strongly shaped by 
his history as a Palestinian refugee, the disappoint-
ments and political setbacks he has witnessed and 
the suspicions that the Arab governments in the  
region benefit from the suffering of people. The couple 
has a mixed relationship with Syrians, characterised 
by empathy and the wish to help, on the one hand, 
and some distrust in the genuineness of their dis-
tress, on the other. The rumours that Syrians have 
gold, better access to informal employment than  
Palestinian–Jordanians and are wealthier than the 
people in the host community have been repeated by 
other Palestinian–Jordanians in different camps. 
The human resource manager of JOHUD states 
that every wave of refugees has affected Jordanians 
differently. When the Iraqi refugees arrived, 11 prices 
increased, because many refugees were rather 
wealthy and invested in Jordan. Some Jordanian 
landowners sold plots to Iraqis and invested the 
money—a new phenomenon in the Jordanian society. 
Whereas many Jordanians perceive the impact of the 
Iraqi refugees on their society as positive, this is not 
the case for the Syrians, who arrived with no or little 
money. The manager explains that Syrians and Jorda-
nians have a very similar culture in which dignity is 
a fundamental characteristic; hence, “the Syrians are 
rivals to Jordanians. They don’t accept having been 
beaten, and they beat Jordanians back. For example, 
during their first days in Zaatari camp, Syrians 
demonstrated for their rights and damned the  
Jordanian government” (human resource manager of  
JOHUD, Amman, November 2016). The perceived  
rivalry is thus a further aspect that shapes the  
established-outsider figuration between Syrians and 
Jordanians (and Palestinian–Jordanians). 
Mixed feelings within the host community also 
occur due to differences in educational opportunities. 
Even in middle-class suburban Ain al-Basha, local  
inhabitants consider it an injustice when Syrians are 
given the opportunity to seek help to pay for univer-
sity fees while the local people were never able to  
 
 
11 \  After the military intervention of the US-led forces to topple Saddam 
Hussein in 2003, about 1.2 million displaced Iraqis arrived as refugees 
in Syria (Dorai, 2008).
Box 12  
An elderly Palestinian's perception of neighbourhood  
relations 
An elderly man of Palestinian origin tells us that socially, al-Hussayn 
has deteriorated. He claims that “there is no social unity and no social 
spirit any more. The old generation has left or died. The children have 
different values. They are engaged in new technologies and have adopted 
a different lifestyle”. He adds that people at his age used to share food, 
whereas the younger generation is no longer doing this. Men would get 
up from their seats on the bus so that women could sit down. Now, 
sometimes men will ask women to stand. 
The elderly man, who had been working as an x-ray technician in the 
Gulf, has no longer any income and says that his three children are also 
in a difficult situation. They received secondary education and are all 
labourers. They have Jordanian citizenship – then he says: “Now you 
enter into politics!”, and when we ask whether the Jordanian passport 
has made life easier, he says: “No answer!” (for an explanation, see  
Annex II). He has a contract with UNRWA since the 1980s according to 
which he is allowed to stay in this house without paying rent. His chil-
dren cannot inherit it legally, but he says, in fact, they will inherit it. 
The elderly man states that when Syrian refugees arrived in Jordan, he 
remembered his own fate as a refugee. He says that many people have 
behaved compassionately towards Syrians and that there is empathy 
and help, especially when it comes to jobs. He cautions that he himself 
has not had any personal experiences but has only heard of it. He adds 
that the Syrians compete for the same jobs as Jordanians with Pales-
tinian origin—not in government and the army, but everywhere else. 
They accept lower wages than the host community. For example, the 
sister of his daughter’s husband dismissed a Palestinian worker and 
replaced him by a Syrian. He mentions that the Syrians get aid in addi-
tion to income from jobs and that the government helps them with 
cheap health services. According to him, “what is happening is part of 
a bigger issue. The Syrians are in all neighbouring countries. This is a 
strategy to gain aid for all those states”.
His wife knows several Syrians and has made friends with them in 
al-Hussayn camp; she visits them, and they visit her. She says: “First, 
it was very bad for Syrians. They had nothing. Palestinians and Jorda-
nians gave them furniture and other things. Now their situation has 
improved a lot. They do not work but receive assistance and even buy 
gold. They have more money than my husband and me. I have never 
been able to buy a single gold ring”. She claims that she has only Syrian 
friends, not from other countries, as in this neighbourhood there are no 
women from other countries, only men. Iraqi women are in Amman, 
too, but not exactly in this neighbourhood (interview in al-Hussayn, 
January 2017)..
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The founder of an Islamic centre in Ain al-Basha 
that focuses on caring for Syrian children confirms 
that the level of education provided to Syrian children 
in afternoon classes is low. He states that one reason 
for this is that teachers are already exhausted from 
the first shift and that doing extra hours reduces 
their concentration. Further reasons for complaints 
by Syrian parents are racism and aggressiveness  
Syrian children are facing at school, in particular by 
Jordanian children coming from families that are not 
exposed to different people like in the urban context 
of Amman. He claims that segregating children at 
school will not solve the problem as groups of Syrian 
children walking to school in the afternoon often are 
harassed in the streets, and walking outside late,  
especially in winter, is not convenient for girls. As a 
result, parents will not allow them to attend school. 
He urges that to avoid this adverse impact, more 
schools need to be built (interview with the founder 
of an Islamic centre in Ain al-Basha, November 2016). 
According to the human resource manager of the 
Jordanian humanitarian and development organisa-
tion JOHUD, problems in the education system do 
not affect Syrians alone. He states that in his opinion, 
the educational system in Jordan collapsed a couple 
of years ago. Previously, only good students were able 
to enter public universities whereas others joined 
afford to study. For Syrians, striving for high education 
is more a matter of course than for Jordanians, as in 
Syria university education is free whereas in Jordan, 
it is not.
Schooling and education as an aspect 
of neighbourhood relations
Syrian refugees are very eager to get their chil-
dren into schools in Jordan. Schooling requires en-
gaging with children, their parents and teachers at a 
neighbourhood level. Whereas Syrians who are regis-
tered with the UNHCR and have official identity 
cards as refugees are allowed to attend Jordanian 
schools, those without registration were blocked 
from visiting schools until 2017. 126,127 or 60 per cent 
of the Syrian children at school age were enrolled in 
formal schools in Jordan in the academic year of 
2016/17. The Jordanian government hired additional 
teachers in response to increasing enrolments so that 
209 schools in Jordan could offer double-shift school-
ing. Usually, Syrian children attend afternoon classes 
and are separated from Jordanian children (Ministry 
of Planning and International Cooperation, 2017). In 
September 2017, the Jordanian Prime Minister finally 
approved a regulation allowing every Syrian refugee 
child, even without the required documents, to enrol 
in the afternoon classes provided by public schools 
(Al Abed, 2017).  
Several Syrian parents interviewed complain 
about the quality of teaching in the Jordanian after-
noon classes. 
The account in Box 13 shows that members of the 
host community insist on having separate classes for  
Syrian and Jordanian children. The official policy of 
non-integration is thus reflected in society. Syrian 
parents are hugely disappointed with the teaching 
standards for their children. Interviews show that 
schooling is a high priority for Syrian refugees; if at 
all possible, they try to make sure that their children 
attend school; if there are no formal schools or if the 
children are facing too much harassment, then they 
arrange for informal teachers who come to their 
house.
Box 13  
Harrassment at school
A female refugee in al-Hussayn camp said: “Education is very bad, the 
teachers do not explain things well to the students; my children don’t 
understand anything. Many teachers are very rude with our children; 
they swear at them and say very bad words. The children at the school 
are very chaotic; there is no discipline. They beat each other a lot. I tried 
to move my children to morning classes. When I went to the school, 
there was also a Palestinian–Jordanian mother from al-Hussayn camp. 
She said that she did not want her kids to stay with ‘Syrians’ and said 
‘no way with Syrians!’ The administration agreed to move the Jordani-
an children to the morning class and refused to shift my children” (Syri-
an refugee woman, al-Hussayn, November 2016).
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to the executive. Tribal affiliations and patronage 
networks linked to the king are the principal mecha-
nisms through which individuals gain political power 
and the ability to represent the interests of their fol-
lowers. Economic wealth and financial relations play 
an increasing role in access to political power. Hence, 
children with prosperous parents who comply with 
this system and belong to the favoured tribes, auto-
matically have a dominant position in school and 
university, no matter how well they do in academic 
terms. Inequality among Jordanians on these 
grounds has grown; Syrian children and youth do not 
have the chance to enter this system and are neither 
welcomed by their Jordanian peers nor by the political 
administration. 
This section has shown that preventing integra-
tion—the official policy of the Jordanian government 
towards refugees—already starts at school, which 
most of the time is the first government institution 
young refugees are confronted with in their lives.  
Disappointed Syrian mothers like in the example 
above ascribe bad behaviour to teachers as well as 
Jordanian mothers and children in an attempt to 
preserve their own and their children’s self-esteem. 
They consider the administration as acting unfairly 
when it supports the cause of Jordanians and denies 
Syrians the same rights. Opening more schools and 
employing more teachers may be a possibility to  
redress segregation and improve schooling conditions 
for girls, but requires the political will to do so—and 
will not overcome the ongoing erosion of the educa-
tional system. Schooling in separate classes for Jorda-
nian and Syrian children is thus only the surface of a 
deep-rooted entrenched structure that perpetuates 
inequality in Jordanian society. It enhances the feel-
ing among the Syrian refugees of being outsiders and 
the attitude of being ‘the established’ among 
Jordanians.
military schools and services or vocational training. 
With the level of educational standards declining, 
students get high marks at their secondary school 
exam, and many more can enter public universities; 
often relying on wasta [relationships with influential 
individuals], which enhances injustice. Poverty and 
its mental effects on the parents  also plays a role: 
“When the father is always stressed and shouts at 
home, the child may imagine that this is normal” 
(human resource manager of JOHUD, Amman,  
November 2016) and start misbehaving accordingly. He 
adds that the misbehaviour of youth towards Syrians 
may also be linked to the changing role of tribes in 
the Jordanian society. Previously, a sheikh who was 
usually “old and wise and people tended to listen to 
him” used to govern a tribe, but “these days, the 
wealthiest man in the tribe is the man that has the 
power. But although he invites the biggest number of 
people frequently to dinner, people don’t tend to listen 
to him often” (human resource manager of JOHUD, 
Amman, November 2016). Nevertheless, “the youth 
are part of tribal communities rather than political 
parties. Because they [the parties] were banned, 12 the 
Jordanian youth are very ignorant on the political 
level” explains the manager. He adds that “the Jorda-
nian is already aggressive; not only towards the Syrian 
refugee. If there is no Syrian, Jordanians will beat 
each other” (human resource manager of JOHUD, 
Amman, November 2016).
According to this explanation, aggressiveness and 
harassment by Jordanian children and youth are 
driven by uncertainties stemming from the social 
transformation in Jordan, which is not reflected ade-
quately in the political institutions. Political parties 
have no significant role in the Jordanian constitu-
tional monarchy, a regime where political power is 
concentrated in the king, and the judiciary is linked 
12 \  Until the early 1990s, political parties were banned in Jordan. Accord-
ing to the political observer Abu Nimah (2017), “most of the political 
parties that appeared in Jordan following the lifting of the ban were 
artificial structures built around individuals hoping to claim a share 
in the next government. And because they did not have broad popular 
bases to rely upon, they either returned to the clan or the tribe for  
support, an option that annuls the very principle of party politics, or 
sought government support in return for committing to be steadily on 
the government’s side on all issues, which also contradicts the entire 
idea of parliamentary supervision of government’s function.”
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Repercussions of neighbourhood  
relations on the livelihood of Syrian 
refugees
Neighbourhood relations can enable refugees to 
extend their scope of action if they receive support 
and help in situations of need and find friends 
among their hosts. The availability of family mem-
bers increases the potential to have positive relation-
ships, as the refugees— women in particular—will 
not feel left alone in the strange environment. Due to 
such interaction, they receive information about jobs, 
customers and opportunities to get assistance, about 
different conditions in various schools, centres they 
can visit for religious purposes, and other things.  
Syrians use these options as far as the relationships 
with the host community allow, thus adding compo-
nents to creating a livelihood according to their own 
standards within the limited scope available.
On the other hand, factors like restrictive govern-
ment policies towards refugees, intransparent eligi-
bility for assistance by humanitarian agencies, being 
of a different social class than the neighbours, a  
different behaviour, clothing and dialect can create 
distrust and suspicions within the host community. 
Such a situation closes options for the agency of the 
refugees and makes them withdraw into their houses, 
avoid public exposure, or move on to another place 
where there are relatives whom they may join. With-
drawal may enhance the suspicion of the host com-
munity, as this gives space for rumours and unproven 
assumptions about the real conditions the refugees 
are living in. Envy and greed can accrue, in particular 
in low-class environments, where the host commu-
nity members themselves are struggling to make a 
living. Social inequality regarding low-class neigh-
bourhood and refugees with a middle-class back-
ground enhances the tension. Interaction can  
become hostile; local children will voice and show 
the disrespect towards the newcomers even more 
openly than their parents. This makes Syrian chil-
dren suffer at school and in the streets and lead Syrian 
parents to the decision to take their children out of 
school. The livelihood of the refugees deteriorates  
under these conditions, and their space for agency 
shrinks. 
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An emerging 'social movement' to help refugees
Beyond neighbourhood relations between indi-
viduals, Jordanians—often of Palestinian origin—and 
even some Syrian students have created more-or-less 
institutionalised initiatives that aim to help the Syrian 
refugees. The particular missions of these initiatives 
vary between charity, medical assistance, religious 
schooling, psychological support, and the provision 
of small and informal income opportunities. These 
initiatives are not or only remotely connected with 
professional humanitarian agencies or the Jordanian 
government. They are self-organised by groups of 
people with a strong common motivation to directly 
help Syrian refugees who arrive in Jordan in a flexible, 
informal way by mobilising financial and medical 
support from empathic citizens in Jordan, the region 
and beyond. Some say that the social engagement of 
the volunteers in Jordan and more indirectly, their 
supporters that are mobilised mainly through social 
media, has features of a local social movement with 
some transnational dimensions. 
A social movement is characterised conceptually 
by particular motivations of participants, mobilisation, 
collective action, public opinion, social and political 
engagement, resource acquisition and allocation  
or sponsorship as well as particular tactics and  
attempts to influence policies (Klandermans & Smith, 
2002; Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002). From a 
more general perspective, social movements have 
been defined as “conscious, concerted, and sustained 
efforts by ordinary people to change some aspect of 
their society by using extra-institutional means” 
(Goodwin & Jasper, 2015, p. 3). In the case of the refu-
gee support initiatives in Amman, political engage-
ment and influencing policies have to be excluded as 
this would immediately be suppressed by the govern-
ment of Jordan, which opposes a local integration of 
refugees for strategic reasons. 13 Conscious, concerted, 
and sustained efforts to generate support for Syrian 
refugees through means outside of government insti-
tutions, however, have prevailed since 2012.Three  
examples are shown below: One of several medical  
 
 
13 \  As mentioned earlier, the Jordanian government fears that any policy 
of refugee integration may lead to the requirement of integrating  
Palestinians, as well, which will close the option to establish a Palesti-
nian state forever.
assistance groups, one of many Islamic centres, and an 
initiative that helps Syrian refugees with Palestinian 
origin in particular. 
Voluntary medical assistance groups
Several voluntary medical assistance groups are 
active in Amman trying to satisfy the health needs of 
refugees that the government of Jordan is not meet-
ing sufficiently. One example is the Molham team, a 
group of young Syrian men and women that provides 
medical help.
Molham Volunteering Team is well-known within 
the community of Syrian refugees in Amman. It is  
famous for its speedy response to health needs, for its 
lack of red tape, and for being free of corruption. Syrian 
refugees inform each other about Molham Team 
through word of mouth and through social media. 
Hospitals know the Molham Voluntary Team and 
give Syrians the contact details so that they can ask 
for an assessment and may become eligible for assis-
tance. Syrian refugees consider Molham Team as  
saviours as the medical aid the refugees receive from 
the United Nations or the Jordanian government 
does not cover surgery. “Very efficient and quick” 
were the testimonies the author received from several 
Syrian refugees. In fact, the team perfectly matches 
one of the most urgent needs of Syrian refugees, 
which is appropriate medical treatment. 
The reason of the students’ commitment is that 
they have the same background of war and displace-
ment as their fellow Syrians. The difference is that 
they are well educated and come from a middle-class 
background with access to means like social media. 
Their ability to learn fast and make practical use of 
their knowledge allowed these students to initiate a 
highly successful charity movement with growing 
numbers of volunteers in countries where the bulk of 
Syrians have sought refuge. Molham Voluntary Team 
is not the only initiative of this kind, started by an  
educated group of individuals and operating inde-
pendently of international humanitarian agencies 
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Box 14 
Foundation, funding, operations and growth of Molham Volunteering Team 
During the research team's visit to the office of Molham Volunteering Team and talk to the founder, Atif Nanu’a, and some members, they tell 
them that ten Syrian students founded the Molham team in 2012. They were studying at the same private university in Amman and had not 
known each other back in Syria. They gathered and developed the idea to give Syrian refugee children in Jordan some fun time and gifts during eid 
(celebration at the end of Ramadan, the month of religious fasting). The group managed to raise funds through Facebook for this purpose and suc-
ceeded in bringing together a big crowd to the event. There, they met some Syrian refugees who were in dire need of surgery. As medical assistance for 
refugees is mostly limited to and mainly covers medical consultations, many Syrians who need surgery depend on additional aid. Prompted by this 
need, they took the initiative and provided Syrian refugees with medical help and food. As the regulations of registration of any organisation re-
quire a Jordanian partner, the Jordanian mother of a team member’s friend volunteered to be the official partner. In the following, Molham Volun-
teering Team was officially established and obtained a license. Molham Volunteering Team is registered as an NGO and has, meanwhile, estab-
lished offices in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. 1
In 2012, a first donor, who decided to remain anonymous, transferred an initial amount of US $15,000 to the Molham team’s account. The initial 
sponsor has continued to pay for the office rent in the three countries and for four volunteers who receive monthly honorariums for their work and 
get transport and some food expenses covered. These four members devote all their time to the Molham team. According to the founder, their pay-
ment is strictly separated from donations for health cases. Altogether, Molham Volunteering Team in the Middle East had around 100 unpaid 
volunteers in 2017. 
The members explain that the NGO is structured into several teams. The case management team receives requests for assistance through Face-
book, WhatsApp, phone, or personal visits. A small team—often including a medical or pharmaceutical student—will then assess each case 
through home visits. If they identify the need for assistance, the case will receive an administrative number, and the Molham team will publish an 
abstract or metaphoric photo and some details on its Facebook page and start collecting money. 2 The donors are from many different countries, 
not only from the Arab world. The organisation continuously announces cases for special donations and preserves some funds for emergency cases.3  
Further teams are working for campaigns such as Ramadhan, winter assistance, and orphans. Some volunteers design and maintain the website, 
others post updates on social media. 
Most of the volunteers are Syrians. As the ten Syrian students of the initial team meanwhile have obtained their degrees, they are in a dilemma 
whether to stay with the Molham team or start their professional careers—a challenge as Syrians do not obtain work permits as engineers or 
medical doctors. One of the founders, for example, decided to stay with the Molham Volunteering Team and not to work as an architect, for which 
he got his degree in 2015. The commitment of the members in the office stems from their perception of an urgent need for medical services that are 
otherwise not available for Syrians. They see the primary value of their initiative in its independence and flexibility as nearly no bureaucracy is 
involved. There are no regulations that constrain aid distributions like in the big international NGOs, and the team is neither restricted to specific 
locations of refugees, age or gender of beneficiaries, or any other limiting factors. The team members emphasise that all volunteers respect  
Molham Volunteering Team’s agenda and are proud not to have to consider the agenda of any other organisation. To maintain their independence, 
the Molham team refuses to accept funds from international donors despite the high demand for medical assistance by the refugees (interviews 
with the founder and members of Molham Voluntary Team, Amman, between November 2016 and January 2017). 
1 \  The NGO is also registered in France, Sweden and Canada but it does not have offices there. The homepage is available at https://molhamteam.com/
en/contact.
2 \  People usually donate via PayPal, but also via bank accounts and Western Union or directly in cash. The donors receive an e-mail stating the amount 
they paid. Each donation is anonymised and visible on the team’s homepage (Molham Volunteering Team, 2018).
3 \  The organisation has accounts in banks in Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and France. Donations are sent to PayPal in France and from there, the money is 
directly transferred to hospitals that treat or enlist Syrians in need. The Molham team continuously has raised funds for cases in need and collected 
more than US $2.7 million between 2015 and early 2017. In 2018, it reached nearly US $9 million (Molham Volunteering Team, 2018).
with a high degree of flexibility and according to 
their own rules. Therefore it is justified to consider 
these initiatives as a kind of social movement among 
middle-class Syrians and some (Palestinian) Jordanians 
that has sprung up to take assistance for the refugees 
in these groups’ own hands.
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Box 15  
Foundation, funding and operations of an Islamic centre in Ain al-Basha
The Islamic centre the research team visited in Ain al-Basha was founded in 2015 by a young Jordanian with Palestinian origin. His intention 
was to offer ‘appropriate support’ to Syrian refugee children, particularly, to Syrian orphans and children whose fathers are reported missing, and 
their mothers. ‘Appropriate support’ derives from the founder’s observation that “Syrian parents will not care much if their children are bullied at 
school, but they will care if they are not getting good marks” (Ain al-Basha, November 2016). Hence, he set up a project that aims to provide a 
place for psychological support for Syrian children who experience aggressiveness and segregation. At the same time, it functions as “a gate to 
religious education” (founder of the Islamic centre, Ain al-Basha, November 2016). 
The Islamic centre is located next to one of the Makani (‘my space’) centres run by UNICEF, which offer services and assistance to vulnerable 
groups in the communities. The Makani centres run programmes linking “interventions in education – learning support services; child protec-
tion—psychosocial support services; adolescent and youth participation—life skills and innovation labs (with) …  health, nutrition, water, sani-
tation and hygiene (WASH) services … (and) a community outreach component” (UNICEF, no year) and operate in all of the 12 Jordanian gover-
norates as well as in the refugee camps. The Islamic centre, by contrast, focuses on the psychological needs of Syrian children and their mothers. It 
offers various kinds of sports and play activities, religious lessons, free drawing and painting, occasional excursions and competitions to develop 
children’s talents playfully. Religious education for Syrian children ususally takes place in Qur’an classes with competitions in learning the verses 
by heart or specialising on tajweed (a set of rules for proper pronunciation and recital of the Qur’an). The founder emphasises that his centre 
strictly avoids competitions in which the best Qur’an citers will receive a reward, as it is common in some other Islamic centres in Amman. 
The Islamic centre in Ain al-Basha also offers weekly Qur’an classes for Syrian women in cooperation with another neighbourhood initiative.  
Psychologists are hired for an honorarium to give courses tailored to the needs of female Syrian refugees; topics are, for example, the relationship 
between mother and son, or raising awareness among children of sexual harassment (interview by R. Alhomeimat with course participants and 
the founder of the Islamic Centre, Ain al-Basha, January 2017). By early 2017, 300 Syrian children had enrolled in the centre’s various activities. 
It had an additional 60 Syrian children in its free kindergarten. Many children still are on a waiting list.
Although he is not professionally trained, the founder of the centre tries to comfort refugee children by allowing them to play freely and do sports 
and by talking to them one-to-one about their feelings and the problems they are facing at school, like bullying and racism. His main motivation 
is religious, as helping orphans in Islam is a good deed. According to him, the Syrian children under his care perform better at school than before. 
While the parents make their children go to public schools, they do not force them to visit the centre. The children enjoy spending time there and 
use its offers of their own accord (interviews with mothers of children at the Islamic centre, Ain al-Basha, between November 2016 and January 
2017; author’s observations). 
Beyond activities for children and classes, the Islamic centre engages in creating small income opportunities for female Syrian refugees by buying 
them sewing or hairdressing equipment so that they can work from home. In another Islamic centre in al-Zarqa governorate, steps have been taken 
to establish a ‘productive collective kitchen’ where Syrian women cook together and gain some profit. From this profit, a portion is set aside to 
open new kitchens where more Syrian women can be employed. Such small jobs for women did not require a work permit (until 2018) and were 
tolerated by the Jordanian government. 1 
According to the founder of the Islamic centre in Ain al-Basha, his concept and commitment attracted the interest of al-Rahma International, a 
long-established Kuwaiti charity organisation affiliated to the Social Reform Association (Eslah) (Kuwait News Agency, 2017). 2 A representative 
of al-Rahma had attended one of the Islamic centre’s charity events and acknowledged the high motivation, the familiarity of the founder with 
the local inhabitants and, in particular, his interaction with Syrian refugee children. Al-Rahma offered to raise funds for the Islamic centre and 
agreed not to interfere in the agenda of the founder, who first was concerned that the charity organisation would impose on him an agenda he 
would have to execute. Until the time of the author's interviews in early 2017, no interference had occurred, and funds were coming in in varying 
amounts and times.
1 \  A change in regulations for home-based small businesses in October 2017 is likely to force the women to close down their small-scale catering 
service businesses. See section on work and employment below.
2 \  The Kuwaiti organisation raises funds for financing various projects. For example, in 2017 al-Rahma won a Saudi Arabian charity organisation as a 
donor in support of a kindergarten project of the Islamic centre. Al-Rahma also supports other Islamic centres in Amman, Irbid and al-Zarqa by  
raising funds from the governments of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar as well as from individual donors who prefer to visit families and donate  
personally. The range of funds varies from two to five thousand Jordanian Dinars and from one month to another (interview by R. Alhomeimat with 
the founder of the Islamic centre, Ain al-Basha, January 2017).
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Islamic centres
 
Different from medical assistance initiatives, the  
Islamic centres in Jordan are religious institutions 
some of which focus on assisting Syrian refugees.  
For Syrian women living in Greater Amman, visiting 
Islamic centres in their neighbourhood is a culturally 
accepted opportunity to participate in activities out-
side their houses and meet each other. Most of the  
research team's female interview partners indicated 
that they try to attend weekly Qur’an lessons in an 
Islamic centre in their neighbourhood. Many parents 
send their children to an Islamic centre for afternoon 
activities. The example of one Islamic centre in Ain 
al-Basha is presented in detail here to shed light on 
its role and meaning for female Syrian refugees (see 
Box 15). 
Syrian female refugees in Greater Amman tend to 
reproduce the lifestyle they had in Syria as far as pos-
sible. When asked about work or any interaction with 
other people, many reply that they visit the religious 
centre in their neighbourhood as an opportunity to 
learn about Islam and the Qur’an, this allows them to 
feel at home when comparing themselves with refu-
gees in non-Muslim or Western countries. Meeting 
with other Syrian women keeps them updated about 
issues like work permits and opportunities for Syrian 
refugees or new laws concerning them. Like many of 
such centres, the Islamic centre became popular 
through word of mouth rather than brochures or ad-
vertisement. Syrian women hear about it mostly from 
their children who know about it from schoolmates. 
The women view the centre as a place where children 
like to go and where they can play and learn the 
Qur’an, an activity that the Syrian women the author 
encountered appreciate (interviews with women 
present at the Islamic centre, Ain al-Basha, November 
2016).
According to several women interviewed, visiting 
the Islamic centre offers them a way to adjust them-
selves to the new neighbourhood. They enjoy meeting 
with other Syrian women there. Moreover, the con-
tacts at the centre increase their chances of getting 
material or financial aid, because frequently there are 
visitors from the Gulf region, in particular from Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, who wish to donate for refugees 
in need. Besides the potential of benefitting from  
donations, the Syrian women find clients there for 
the products of their small income-generating activi-
ties at home such as prepared food, hairdressing or 
sewing. Sometimes they can cater for occasions at 
the centre, which they also consider beneficial. A few  
female Syrian refugees volunteer in the centre and 
provide help to Syrian children, in particular to those 
who missed classes while being displaced, and re-
ceive a modest compensation amounting to about 
JOD 100 every month from the Islamic centre. This 
opportunity, however, is only available to very few 
women as funds for this purpose are limited. The per-
spective of the voluntary work is not clear, too, so that 
women cannot rely on the compensation for a longer 
period (interview with one of the female volunteers 
and the founder of the Islamic centre, Ain al-Basha, 
November 2016). For female Syrian refugees, the  
Islamic centre thus provides livelihood opportunities 
that make it possible for them to reproduce their  
previous lifestyle to some degree, and it is a site 
where women are building social capital.
However, the Islamic centre also faces challenges 
related to the availability of numerous and various 
aid organisations focusing on Syrian refugees. Some 
Syrian refugee families take advantage of the fact 
that community-based organisations, international 
NGOs and United Nations agencies poorly coordinate 
their supply of aid to accumulate aid from different 
donors. Some organisations do not want to coordinate 
and are not concerned by doubling or tripling the aid 
for certain families, because reaching a large group  
of beneficiaries is most important for these organisa-
tions as this impresses their donors and hence sus-
tains the donations. According to the founder of the 
Islamic centre in Ain al-Basha, the availability of 
funds has also prompted individuals to establish 
Qur’an teaching organisations, who never before had 
engaged in religious practices. Some of these organi-
sations remunerate children who win in arranged 
competitions after having learned certain parts of 
Qur’an by heart. Currently, funding is declining, and 
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society. The centre is open for Syrian children and 
Syrian women only. The volunteers are also Syrians. 
The centre thus enhances the segregation of Syrians 
from their neighbours. This will neither reduce the 
aggressiveness of Jordanian children towards Syrians 
at school nor the suspicions of adult neighbours  
towards the ‘outsiders’.
Clandestine assistance groups
The third type of initiative introduced here has a 
particular focus on assisting the about 17,000 Syrian 
Palestinians who have fled from the war in Syria 
(Amin, 2017) and many of whom have arrived from 
Yarmouk Camp, Damascus, Deraa town or Deraa 
Camp in Syria. In the following, some background  
information on the precarious status of this group 
will be provided to put the role of clandestine support 
organisations into perspective.
Before the start of the protest movement in 2011, 
about 550,000 Palestinian refugees had been staying 
in Syria (BADIL, 2014; Amin, 2017) for more than 40 
years, protected by the Syrian governments. Both gov-
ernments, the current under Bashar al-Asad and the 
previous under his father Hafiz al-Asad had claimed 
to be guardians of the Palestinian refugees and their 
right of return to Palestine. Hence, Palestinians  
enjoyed equal civil rights as Syrian citizens, with the 
exception of obtaining full Syrian citizenship and the 
right to vote (Gilen et al., 1994). They were allowed to 
join the Syrian Army, they often intermarried with 
Syrians (Bolongaro, 2016), and they had access to pub-
lic Syrian health centres and hospitals as well as to 
UNRWA primary health services (Amin, 2017).
In 2012, the Palestinian camps of Deraa and  
Yarmouk came under attack in the course of the Syrian 
war, resulting in extensive civilian casualties and  
destruction as well as high numbers of internally  
displaced Palestinians. UNRWA estimates that 
280,000 Palestinians have been displaced in Syria and 
120,000 have fled to neighbouring countries (UNRWA, 
2018a). However, as Palestinians, they are politically 
enhanced competition among organisations that 
care for orphans increasingly prevents cooperation 
between them. In this environment, coordination is 
a major challenge for the Islamic centre in Ain al- 
Basha, as it tries to avoid assisting people that already 
receive aid from other bodies. For this purpose, its 
founder coordinates the centre’s activities with six 
other organisations in the neighbourhood. However, 
according to his assessment, more collective effort is 
required towards this end (interview by R. Alhomei-
mat, Ain al-Basha, January 2017). 
To sum up, the Islamic centre in Ain al-Basha 
tries to take on a complementary role by not provid-
ing the same activities as the neighbouring Makani 
centre for children run by UNICEF and other reli-
gious organisations. In contrast to UNICEF that oper-
ates with its own (Jordanian) staff, the Islamic centre 
works with carefully selected Syrian volunteers. None 
of them should have relations with any political  
or radical party, but a genuine interest in helping  
orphans. This explains part of the success of the  
Islamic centre, which attracts much higher numbers 
of children than the UNICEF centre. The Syrian vol-
unteers have an original motivation for caring about 
their children and continue working even if they are 
not paid in certain months (interview with founder 
and volunteers of the Islamic centre, Ain al-Basha, 
January 2017).  
Running an Islamic centre with a focus on Syrian 
orphans and widows is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
by offering religious activities to refugees, it helps 
them to preserve a culture that women had practised 
already in Syria and allows them to reproduce their 
previous lifestyle in a protected place. Moreover, it 
contributes to the refugees’ livelihood by assisting 
with small jobs and education. It is thus an example 
of an institution, self-organised by a Jordanian (with 
Palestinian origin) that provides the Syrian refugees 
(women and children) with opportunities to meet, 
socialise and maintain a certain level of livelihood. 
On the other, the centre creates a parallel society for 
refugees in the neighbourhood, because its activities 
do not bridge the gap between refugees and the host 
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not accepted as refugees in Jordan. According to UNRWA 
(2015), 
since January 2013, the Government of Jordan’s offi-
cial policy has been not to allow Palestine refugees 
from Syria into Jordan. Many who have managed to 
enter Jordan have done so irregularly, thus exacer-
bating their vulnerability. Many live in constant fear 
of forced return and have limited mobility and access 
to employment, services and civil and legal processes.
In a nutshell, the reason is the following.
(A)fter a relatively tolerant phase during which some 
10,000 Palestinian refugees have been able to enter 
the country, Jordan has tightened its entry policy 
since late 2012 on behalf of the need to counter the 
Israeli vision of Jordan as Palestinian homeland of 
substitution (Al-Husseini, 2015; translation from 
French in Dorai, 2018).
The government of Jordan is concerned that the 
Palestinian–Syrians, unlike other Syrians, may 
choose not to return to Syria when the war ends 
(Amin, 2017), thus creating facts that imply the risk, 
from the Jordanian perspective, to make Jordan the 
home country of Palestinians. As a consequence, this 
will render the establishment of a Palestinian state 
impossible. To preclude such a development, the gov-
ernment of Jordan closed its borders for this group of 
Box 16  
Foundation, funding and operations of one clandestine assistance group for Palestinian–Syrian refugees
The interview partner was born in Jordan and has Jordanian citizenship. His father had fled from the Palestinian territories to Jordan in 1967; 
his mother is a Palestinian from Syria and had received Jordanian citizenship through her husband (for details on the status of Palestinians, see 
Annex II). The interview partner had been living in Yarmouk camp, a large settlement of Palestinians in Damascus, Syria, for some time and cur-
rently has regular employment in Amman. In 2012, when growing numbers of Palestinian–Syrians arrived together with Syrian refugees in Jordan, 
he founded a group with seven members all of whom have a Palestinian background; five of them have a Jordanian passport. The group members 
have known each other from Yarmouk camp. More volunteers joined the group over the years, most of them are men.
Like other self-organised assistance groups, this group also collects funds to assist Syrian refugees, supplies them with basic needs and rapidly 
provides assistance in an informal, flexible manner when the group hears about any emergency. What is special to them is that they include  
undocumented Palestinian–Syrians in their operations. The interview partner claims that the assistance group has no administrative expenses, a 
point he repeatedly emphasises with pride. According to him, each member of the group pays for himself, although according to Islam, a Muslim 
who raises funds for charity purposes legitimately can keep a share for himself. The group has no constant donors. Sometimes friends who have a 
good income donate; some donors are Jordanians who live in Saudi Arabia. The interview partner adds that “here in Jordan, they do not donate. 
They are afraid,” indicating that some of the assistance his group provides is against Jordanian law. Sometimes, the group provides persons from 
abroad who are willing to donate with the contact of Syrian refugees in need so that they can support these persons directly. Donors know about 
the group through Facebook and word of mouth. Between 2012 and 2016, the group raised about JOD 1.200 million (US $1.693 million) to support 
mainly Palestinian refugees from Syria (founder of assistance group for Palestinian–Syrian refugees, Amman, November 2016).
The group focused its assistance on Palestinian refugees during the siege by nidham (the [Syrian) regime) of Yarmouk camp that started in 2013. 
The interview partner says: “We started with Syrian refugees. Then we saw that nobody helped the Palestinian–Syrian refugees”. Besides the  
perceived assistance gap, the motivation of the group to help Palestinian refugees from Syria is influenced by the fact that members have relatives 
who live in Yarmouk camp. In general, according to the founder, the group’s activities are guided by the desire to maintain the right of the refugees 
to return to Palestine; hence, the group rejects any endeavours that could lead to Jordan becoming an alternative homeland for Palestinians  
(for details, see Annex II). A further guiding principle seems to be to keep a respectful distance to young women. The group members usually ask 
parents if their daughters have everything they need. Moreover, they try to protect girls from early marriages as far as possible. The interview 
partner tells us that once he had a fight with a Jordanian guard in Zaatari camp where the group secretly distributed goods. The guard wanted a 
young refugee girl to marry his brother. The interview partner reports that as a consequence of the fight, this guard made sure that he was not  
allowed to enter any refugee camp in Jordan again (interview with the founder of assistance group for Palestinian–Syrian refugees, Amman,  
November 2016).
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refugees already in April 2012 (UNRWA, 2018a; BADIL, 
2014) and officially announced a policy of non-admit-
tance for Palestinian–Syrians in January 2013. 
Due to this policy, Palestinian–Syrian refugees 
are not allowed to enter the established camps like 
Zaatari in Jordan; as Palestinians, they fall under the 
care of UNRWA (Amin, 2017). The Jordanian govern-
ment also revoked permits for Palestinians from Syria 
to leave their temporary facilities. Those refugees 
whom the Jordanian police can catch are forcibly  
deported back to Syria. The Jordanian authorities  
arbitrarily detain Palestinian refugees from Syria in a 
closed refugee holding facility at Cyber City near 
Ramtha at the Syrian border, denying them any  
option for release other than return to Syria. 
By declaring Palestinian–Syrian refugees personae 
non gratae, the Jordanian Authorities stripped them 
from their right to protection, and by such making 
them susceptible to abuses, exploitation, arrest, and 
deportation. Additionally, all unregistered Palestini-
an refugees are denied access to education and 
healthcare, and they cannot work. Moreover, Pales-
tinian refugees from Syria are not allowed into estab-
lished refugee camps, therefore are forced to seek 
housing in the expensive private market (BADIL, 
2014).
The Palestinians from Syria face the same diffi-
cult conditions and are affected by illnesses and trau-
mata like other refugees from Syria (Amin, 2017), but 
are not subject to any legal protection. They do not 
have access to international assistance in Jordan like 
Syrian citizens do, and income opportunities for 
them are limited to illegal jobs in the informal econ-
omy. Many rely mainly on UNRWA support for basic 
needs including food and shelter, medical care and 
access to schools (UNRWA, 2015). 14 For some time,  
the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) also 
14 \  The study by Amin (2017) shows that UNRWA-registered Palestinian–
Syrians enjoy free medical treatment funded by UNRWA and that they 
generally receive better services than Palestinian refugees from Gaza 
living in Jordan. According to the founder of a group that assists Pales-
tinian–Syrian refugees, there is an agreement between UNRWA and 
the Jordanian government about certain files of Palestinians from  
Syria, which UNRWA is allowed to keep confidential. UNRWA has the 
right to assist the persons who are listed in these files without infor-
ming the Jordanian government (interview in Amman, November 
2017). The author is unable to verify this
supported Palestinians in need including those com-
ing from Syria with some occasional assistance. 15 
Many Palestinian–Syrians, however, hide in Greater 
Amman without being registered anywhere out of 
fear of being deported.
Self-organised assistance for Palestinian–Syrian  
refugees
A few small organisations have formed that try to 
assist Palestinian–Syrians in particular. As this group 
of refugees is persecuted by Jordanian authorities, 
these organisations are working underground. The 
author had the opportunity to conduct an in-depth 
interview with one of the volunteers and join him 
during visits of refugees under the care of his self-or-
ganised assistance group (observations and inter-
views with a member of a volunteer assistance group 
for Syrian refugees, Amman, November 2016).
The interview partner estimates that 600 Pales-
tinian–Syrian families stay in Jordan illegally. Among 
them are Palestinians from Syria who previously had 
the Jordanian citizenship; however, they lost it in  
the course of the revocation of citizenship in 2009 
and became stateless (see Annex II for a background 
on this). Some had been deported to Syria from the 
detention camp in Cyber City and come back to Jordan 
illegally. Palestinian refugees from Syria who are not 
registered are not eligible to UNRWA services (founder 
of assistance group for Palestinian–Syrian refugees, 
Amman, November 2016).  Supporting a criminalised 
target group requires particular strategies to identify 
the needy and supply them with assistance
The interview partner estimates that 600 Pales-
tinian–Syrian families stay in Jordan illegally. Among 
them are Palestinians from Syria who previously had 
the Jordanian citizenship; however, they lost it in the 
course of the revocation of citizenship in 2009 and 
became stateless (see Annex II for a background on 
this). Some had been deported to Syria from the de-
tention camp in Cyber City and come back to Jordan  
 
 
 
15 \  According to a Palestinian–Jordanian the team interviewed in Amman 
in November 2016, recently the PLO no longer has been approved by 
the Jordanian Intelligence and hence cannot provide assistance to 
Palestinians in Jordan officially. The author is unable to verify this.
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France. In another case, the police arrested two teen-
agers (16 and 14) and deported them to Syria. The 
mother had a Jordanian passport, and the father was 
not present. The assistance group helped the teenagers 
to cross the border again and return to Jordan.
The assistance group helps not only Palestinian–
Syrian refugees but also Syrians. In Zaatari camp, 
some refugees have not got a UNHCR card but want 
to leave the camp. They have the option to return  
to the camp and get the UNHCR card, but they will 
have to wait for it for a long time. The assistance 
group helps them leave the camp through volunteers 
who are staying in Zaatari. The group also has several 
Jordanian volunteers who teach refugee children in 
the camps.
The group does not only operate in Jordan but 
also has supported Palestinians who were caught in 
the siege of Yarmouk camp in Damascus, which started 
in 2013. Yarmouk then became a battle site between 
Daesh and the Syrian Army until April 2018 when the 
siege ended (Rollins, 2018). The founder of the assis-
tance group explains that his group collected funds 
from Palestinians in Jordan and sent the money to 
individuals in the camp through agents in Jordan 
and Syria who would receive a commission. Money 
used to flow in both directions; Palestinian–Syrians 
would send money to Palestinians in Jordan and vice 
versa. Through this procedure, they circumvented the 
ban of taking money or valuable goods out of Syria, 
which otherwise would be seized by the Syrian regime 
forces at the airport. The group preferred to provide 
the Palestinians in Yarmouk with cash, because the 
armed guards (paramilitary forces called aknaaf bayt 
al-magdis) confiscated all aid packages destined for 
the camp inhabitants and sold them inside the camp 
at high prices. The cash assistance allowed the Pales-
tinians inside Yarmouk camp to buy the aid packages 
from the guards. People in need know about the 
group through relatives, friends, and social media. 
The relatives of the interview partner in Syria, for ex-
ample, have his phone number, and if they encounter 
illegally. Palestinian refugees from Syria who are not 
registered are not eligible to UNRWA services (founder 
of assistance group for Palestinian–Syrian refugees, 
Amman, November 2016). 16 Supporting a criminalised 
target group requires particular strategies to identify 
the needy and supply them with assistance.
Assistance strategies for threatened people
The self-organised group assists Palestinian refu-
gees from Syria who live in Jordanian towns under 
dire conditions. Male Palestinian refugees without 
documents cannot risk walking in the streets of  
Amman, because they are at constant risk of being 
caught and deported. Hence, they face a similar 
threat as in Syria where police or intelligence would 
either imprison them or recruit them into the army. 
Staying in al-Hussayn is particularly risky because 
the Jordanian intelligence systematically searches 
for Palestinian–Syrian refugees there. Therefore, the 
refugees remain in the margins of the settlement 
and avoid any interaction with their neighbours,  
trying hard not to be discovered. To protect the men, 
women will go out and buy the daily necessities for 
their families whereas men stay at home. However, 
even if families receive assistance from UNRWA, they 
increasingly face the problem of rising costs of living 
in Jordan. For those Palestinian–Syrian refugees who 
cannot afford to pay for what is required, the assis-
tance group distributes furniture, clothes, medicine, 
food and sometimes money. Whenever the assistance 
group hears about landlords expelling Palestinian–
Syrian refugees from their homes, they would offer 
them a furnished apartment. To provide some enter-
tainment to Palestinian–Syrians who are confined to 
their homes in the suburbs of Jordan, the assistance 
group has made secret excursions with some of them 
into the desert. 
Once, the group helped a Palestinian refugee 
from Syria who was an artist and who was pursued 
by the Jordanian intelligence. The group managed to 
help him get asylum for himself and his family in 
 
16 \  In general, Palestinians without Jordanian citizenship are facing 
restrictions with regard to access to healthcare. They have to pay  
higher fees than Jordanian citizens, and they have to pay for infant 
vaccinations (HRW, 2010, pp. 3, 49).
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The self-organised group cannot provide this 
kind of more sustainable assistance because it only 
collects funds for immediate help. The founder of the 
group is particularly concerned about Palestinian–
Syrian refugees’ children who have to work illegally 
instead of attending school. Adults also have to work 
illegally, hidden in their houses, whereas Syrians of 
non-Palestinian origin can obtain work permits (see 
section on work and employment below). Asked 
about the possibilities of finding Palestinian busi-
nessmen who could donate a larger amount for such 
an employment project, the interview partner argues 
that most wealthy people he has met want their 
name to be emphasised and made public so that the 
project is run under their name. He says:
They want to use it for other purposes, mostly political 
ones. For example, a Jordanian in Cyber City offered 
me JOD 20,000 (US $28,000) for a start-up project, 
but I refused for this reason. There is another example 
of a known political powerholder and arms trader. If 
he became a sponsor, this would damage the image of 
our group. He would want to make us clients, de-
pendent on him, in return for donations (founder of 
the group assisting Palestinian–Syrian refugees, 
Amman, November 2016).
The founder of the group expects the United Na-
tions to react to the difficult situation of Palestinian 
refugees from Syria. He suggests that the UN should 
insist on an agreement between the Jordanian gov-
ernment and UNRWA according to which Palestinian–
Syrian refugees can obtain a residence permit and 
based on that, a work permit, as many of these refu-
gees have valuable skills.
This self-organised assistance group shows the 
most extreme engagement in providing refugees 
from Syria with as much ability to act on their own 
behalf as possible under particularly harsh condi-
tions. To this aim, the group does not shy away from 
engaging in illegal activities in response to the crimi-
nalisation of Palestinian refugees from Syria and Syr-
ians who do not comply with the camp bureaucracy 
in Jordan. Arguably, the mothers with small children 
hiding in Greater Amman and fearing to be caught by 
the police whenever they leave the house to buy food 
a family in need, they will inform him, so that the 
group can organise assistance. One relative works as 
a nurse in Yarmouk camp and continuously keeps 
him updated. When the siege of Yarmouk was relaxed, 
some Palestinians there did no longer need assis-
tance. Upon calls by friends, group members contin-
ue to assist families in Yarmouk as well as others who 
left the camp and need assistance elsewhere in 
Damascus.
These examples show that the assistance group’s 
responses to the particular needs of Syrian and Pales-
tinian–Syrian refugees are extremely flexible with ac-
tivities ranging from providing furniture to reuniting 
families after deportation. The group acts beyond the 
legal limitations of the country out of empathy and 
solidarity with people who have fallen between the 
cracks of ordinary social life.
Similar to the Molham Voluntary Team and the 
Islamic centre in Ain al-Basha, the group that assists 
the Palestinian–Syrian refugees in particular is not 
convinced of the work of the international humani-
tarian agencies. More outspoken than the interview 
partners of the other self-organised groups, the 
founder of the Palestinian–Syrian refugee assistance 
group points out that the international humanitarian 
organisations “are all thieves, or very unprofessional”. 
He continues: “We are aware that aid agencies use a 
lot of funds for their own administration, logistics, 
and staff. They are thieves. Religious organisations 
are also thieves” (founder of the group assisting  
Palestinian–Syrian refugees, Amman, November 2016). 
He argues that Jordanians themselves can provide 
the assistance many refugees would benefit from.
People who are working in Jordan have an income. 
They could easily employ those who do not have em-
ployment. Reasonable projects could be made, such 
as women producing cheese, cooking, or working as 
hair stylists, or mechanics; people can work with 
their hands. If I had the money, I would open a salon 
for a woman, and she could work as a hair stylist, 
and she would get her share of the income, and with 
the rest, I would open another shop. In any case, I 
would pay a salary, no matter if it is legal or illegal 
(founder of the group assisting Palestinian–Syrian 
refugees, Amman, November 2016).
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are one of the most vulnerable groups of refugees 
currently staying in Jordan. Interviews with some of 
them in their houses confirm the dauntless efforts of 
the assistance group that gives intimidated refugees 
a feeling of being protected when it comes to emer-
gencies like being forced to leave the flat without  
notice, illnesses, and when exhausted mothers are 
desperate (authors’ observation and interviews with 
female Palestinian refugees from Syria, Amman,  
November 2016). The livelihood support the assistance 
group provides may refer to very basic needs such as 
enabling Palestinian–Syrian refugees to buy food, 
medicine, or live in a furnished flat. It may just be  
support to realise the desire of Syrian refugees to leave 
Zaatari camp or to return to the family in Jordan  
after being deported to Syria. For those caught in Yar-
mouk camp in Syria during the siege, the money the 
group members sent to them to buy the aid packages 
previously confiscated by the regime may just prevent 
some families from starvation. As a whole, these activ-
ities appear to be the closest possible response to the 
various needs of war-affected families from Syria to 
overcome their current hardship. 
This voluntary assistance group for Syrian refu-
gees thus appears to be the deepest extension of a 
broader social movement committing itself to 
non-bureaucratic and self-organised assistance to 
refugees from Syria. The three groups presented in 
depth here have three things in common. They insist 
on identifying the beneficiaries personally; they 
make the decisions on what kind and amount of as-
sistance they can provide taking into consideration 
the various needs they encounter, and they respond 
with great flexibility and speed to whatever needs 
they have identified. Hence, in the eyes of the benefi-
ciaries, the groups’ activities are a major contribution 
to maintaining their livelihoods as much as possible 
under the adverse conditions of being (criminalised) 
refugees and to supporting their agency. One of the 
limitations of these voluntary groups is that they are 
unable to provide refugees with sustainable income- 
generating activities. This dimension of securing ref-
ugees’ livelihood in Jordan deserves a chapter on its 
own as it touches the sensitive political issue of pro-
tecting nationals from the economic competition by 
foreigners.
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pressures of protracted displacement consider the 
work of children to be an important part of their live-
lihood (Achilli, 2017). In general, working standards 
declined in Jordan as a consequence of the influx of 
Syrian informal workers, and Jordanians perceived 
the Syrian refugees increasingly as competitors for 
scarce employment opportunities. 18 
The government of Jordan has been hesitant to 
issue work permits to Syrian refugees. From an eco-
nomic perspective, Jordan could benefit from skilled 
Syrian workers. The human resource manager of JO-
HUD commented on the issue of work permits for 
Syrian refugees that if Syrians and Jordanians 
worked together, the Jordanians would learn from 
the Syrians; however, there would be the danger of 
Syrians taking advantage of market opportunities at 
the expense of the Jordanians. The manager draws a 
typical conclusion from the Jordanian perspective: 
“What we really need is regulatory legislation to con-
sider both communities” (human resource manager 
of JOHUD, Amman, November 2016). The call for more 
regulation to protect Jordanians from competition 
reflects the predominance of the public sector in the 
Jordanian economy, a system that is deeply en-
trenched in Jordanian society and opposes efforts to 
liberalise, privatise and open up the economy to neo-
liberal globalisation (cf. also Lenner & Turner, 2018).
A second reason that speaks against work per-
mits for Syrian refugees comes from a political point 
of view. In line with the government of Jordan, the 
JOHUD manager points out that
we don’t want this work permit to let the Syrians 
maintain a livelihood in Jordan permanently, leading 
to the fact that Syrians settle in Jordan for good like 
what happened in the case of Palestinians. It is a 
pity that the young generation of Jordanians who are  
Palestinians by birth feel that they do not belong in 
Palestine and have lost their Palestinian identity 
 
crease in child labour is driven by the increase in the Syrian populati-
on that has arrived in Jordan since 2012.
18 \  The unemployment rate in Jordan amounted to 18.2 percent of the 
labour force in the first quarter of 2017 (Azzeh, 2017) and to 18.7 per cent 
in the second quarter of 2018 (DoS, 2018). Unemployment had increa-
sed by 3.6 percent from the first quarter of 2016 and in 2017, it had rea-
ched the highest rate in 25 years. Unemployment affected 13.9 percent 
of the men and 33 percent of the women in 2017 (Azzeh, 2017) and 16.8 
per cent of the men and 26.8 percent of the women in 2018 (DoS, 2018). 
Until 2015, Syrian refugees had no right to be  
employed or work in Jordan, except those about ten 
per cent who had obtained a work permit individually 
through their employer in one way or another.  
According to the ILO (2017), “(t)he rest of the Syrian 
refugee workforce was working in an expanding in-
formal economy, characterised by low and declining 
wages, long working days, and poor working condi-
tions, including lack of work contracts” (2017). The 
ILO estimates that slightly more than half of the 
male Syrian refugees are employed formally or infor-
mally in Jordan.
Nevertheless, competition over employment  
between Jordanians, Syrian refugees and labour  
migrants from neighbouring countries is high. Al-
though foreign engineers or doctors are not granted 
work permits, Syrian doctors work illegally in private 
medical centres for low salaries and engineers in pri-
vate real estate or IT companies (interviews with the 
human resource manager of JOHUD and a Syrian 
engineer in Amman, November 2016). Syrians are 
considered to be particularly skilful and hence, easily 
get freelance contracts in construction, carpentry, as 
office boys or in agriculture without any work permit. 
In these fields, they mainly compete with Egyptian 
labour migrants, but recently, also with Jordanians, 
in particular in the fertile areas of Ghor al-Safi and 
Ghor al-Mazra’a (human resource manager of JOHUD, 
November 2016). 
According to a study of economists, only 20 per 
cent of the Syrians living outside camps and 13 per 
cent inside the camps were employed in 2016. Among 
the employed Syrian refugees, 43 per cent held a work 
permit. Whereas only 40 per cent of the informally 
employed Syrian refugees had a work permit, but nei-
ther a work contract nor social insurance, 73 per cent 
of the formally employed Syrian refugees (with con-
tract and insurance) had obtained a work permit 
(Krafft et al., 2018). Moreover, the number of child  
labourers has increased rapidly in Jordan. It more 
than doubled between 2007 and 2016 to 69,000 chil-
dren of whom about 44,000 were working under haz-
ardous conditions. 17 Families facing the economic 
17 \  According to Shteiwi et al. (2016), 95 per cent of Jordanian and 72.5 per 
cent of the Syrian children in a sample of 20,000 children between age 
5 and 17 in Jordan were enrolled in schools. This suggests that the in-
Work and employment—A sensitive issue
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2\ a segmented labour market that reserves white- 
collar employment to Jordanians and allocates 
blue-collar work to migrants who are kept in 
precarious labour conditions, and
3\  “the political creation of informality” (Lenner & 
Turner, 2018, p. 2) represented by a large informal 
economic sector that provides fall-back options 
for significant numbers of Jordanians, but also 
for numerous migrants and refugees that have 
dropped out of or never entered the formal eco-
nomy (Collier & Betts, 2017). Collier & Betts (2017) 
rightly point out that the mass influx of Syrian 
refugees has provided an opportunity for the Jor-
danian government to tap into new money flows 
from international aid agencies that support Jor-
danian refugee camps; an incentive that prevents 
the government from integrating refugees in the 
national labour market. According to Collier & 
Betts (2017), “while most [Syrian refugees in Jor-
dan] subsist via the informal economy, few are 
able to access formal work permits, either because 
they are prohibitively expensive or because of the 
restrictive bureaucratic process”. 
Three years into the Syrian crisis, the renowned 
economists Alexander Betts and Paul Collier used 
their expert status to propagate an alternative and 
recommended a strong policy towards labour market 
integration of Syrians in Jordan. The two main reasons 
for this advice were averting the aid dependency  
syndrome from Syrians in protracted displacement 
in Jordan and avoiding inefficiency by excluding  
refugees and their skills from the labour markets. 
Aiming to make refugees “agents of development” 
(Collier & Betts, 2017), the two economists used their 
influence to pave the way for realising this vision 
through the EU–Jordan Compact (Barbelet et al., 2018).
In February 2016, a donor conference for Syria in 
London pledged funds amounting to US $1.7 billion 
for grants and concessional financial support for  
Jordan’s national Syrian refugee response plan. This 
was a new effort to address the perceived critical con-
dition of the Jordanian economy with its huge public 
and their connection to their land. We don’t want 
this for Syrians to happen (human resource manager 
of JOHUD, Amman, November 2016).
From this perspective, Syrian refugees should not 
be offered opportunities that could allow them to 
make a living and settle. Some officials believe that 
issuing work permits to Syrian refugees is the first 
step towards this end, which explains the Jordanian 
government’s reluctant response to requests of allevi-
ating access to work permits for Syrian refugees. “We 
always think about Syrians in a humanitarian way; 
they are our brothers and neighbours”, adds the JOHUD 
manager (Amman, November 2016). This also reflects 
the view of the Jordanian government, which has to 
be understood against the background of the legacy 
of the decade-long stay of Palestinian refugees in  
Jordan. The Jordanian government has objected the 
formal or legal integration of Palestinians to keep the 
option of an independent Palestine with the ensuing 
return of the Palestinians who live in Jordan politi-
cally open. The politics of hosting Palestinian refu-
gees and denying them integration intend to not  
preclude the establishment of a Palestinian state. The 
unsolved Palestinian issue thus entails the political 
impossibility of ‘integrating’—in this case Syrian—
refugees. The concern that a similar fate threatens 
the Syrian refugees does not seem to be exaggerated 
from the Jordanian historical experience (cf. also  
El-Abed, 2014).
Changing conditions of employment 
for Syrians in Jordan: The EU–Jordan 
Compact
According to an insightful study on the workings 
of the Jordanian labour market by Lenner & Turner 
(2018), three main underlying dynamics have shaped 
Jordan’s political economy for the past decades:
1\ a ‘zonal development’ strategy intended to en-
hance economic growth through investment in 
special economic zones and development 
corridors,
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non-Jordanians (Barbelet et al., 2018). 21 Hence, mi-
grant workers from Middle Eastern, North African 
and Asian countries are the main competitors for 
Syrians in the setting of the EU–Jordan Compact, 
whereas Jordanian workers do not face employment 
threats (ILO, 2017), as they rarely work in the low-paid 
unskilled jobs available in those factories. The Compact 
also stipulates improvements of the business and 
investment environment in Jordan and the formali-
sation of Syrian businesses, which always require  
Jordanian partners. With regard to social services, 
the EU–Jordan Compact contains the commitment to 
provide capacities in schools for all Syrian children 
as well as some vocational training opportunities 
(Barbelet et al., 2018). 
Considered from a strategic perspective, the EU–
Jordan Compact is an experiment that brings together 
interests in drawing on refugees’ assumed resilience 
and a reduction of the need for aid, boosting stagnant 
economies through their incorporation into the  
globalised economy, and keeping refugees away from 
Europe. In the words of Lenner & Turner (2018, p. 12), 
(r)ather than refugees being an economic burden, 
this zonal economy—a second-tier and temporary 
form of socioeconomic integration—would boost the 
overall local economy, particularly in export-oriented 
manufacturing. At the same time, formal employ-
ment possibilities in neighboring states would pro-
vide the incentive for Syrians to stay where they are, 
rather than attempt the journey to Europe.
Furthermore, the Compact is an attempt to  
enhance the private sector and thus open up the  
Jordanian public sector-dominated economy towards 
a (neo-)liberal market economy.
21 \  The professions that are closed for non-Jordanians are medical pro-
fessions; engineering professions; administrative and accounting pro-
fessions; clerical work including typing and secretarial work, switch-
boards, telephones and connections work; work in warehouses, in 
sales, including all groups; hairdressers; decorators; teachers, includ-
ing all specialties except for the rare ones when there is no Jordanian 
available; selling fuel in main cities; professions dealing with electric-
ity; mechanics and professions dealing with car repairs; drivers; 
guards and servants; caretakers (Arida Law Firm, no year).
sector and rudimentary capitalist private sector, 
while informal employment was growing. 19 The pledges 
contained the commitment by the European Union 
(EU) member states to simplify the rules of origin to 
facilitate exports from Jordan to the European market. 
According to the EU–Jordan Compact between the 
European Union, the government of Jordan and the 
World Bank, the rules governing the export of a wide 
range of commodities produced in factories in 18  
designated economic zones and industrial areas in 
Jordan were relaxed for ten years. The time frame for 
the simpler rules of origin will be extended when the 
target of employing 200,000 Syrian refugees with for-
mal contracts, based on work permits to be issued by 
the Jordanian Ministry of Labour, has been reached. 
The factories are required to hire up to 15 per cent 
Syrians of the total workforce per factory (European 
Commission, 2016). In December 2018, the EU High 
Representative Federica Mogherini and King Abdullah 
II of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan drew conse-
quences from the low performance of the EU-Jordan 
Compact. They agreed to extend it up to 2030  and  
further relax the criteria for companies operating in 
Jordan to become eligible for the preferential trade 
regime (EEAS, 2018).
The government of Jordan used to issue work 
permits for foreign labour mainly in the sectors of 
construction, agriculture and manufacturing, areas 
where migrant workers prevail and which do not  
involve any significant competition with Jordanians. 
20 Employment in trade and sales, white-collar jobs, 
teaching, working in health or education, informa-
tion technology and other services is closed for  
 
 
 
19 \  The donors included the United Nations and governments from  
Europe and the Gulf. 
20 \  According to the ILO, “work permit requirements can be understood 
as set provisions that either the worker or employer must comply with 
before they can proceed to submit a work permit application. Require-
ments currently include obtaining a business license (for the employer), 
a Ministry of Interior service card (for Syrian employee) and, for the 
employer, complying with other regulations related to migrant workers 
(quotas/closed sectors/closed occupations/maximum number of work 
permits)” (ILO, 2017, p. 37).
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The ILO survey indicates that from the perspec-
tive of Syrian refugees, the main advantage of having 
a work permit is better protection from being caught 
by the police that would take them back to a camp. 
The ILO also reports that incidences where Syrian 
workers are not paid at all or below the minimum 
wages for migrants of JOD 150 (US $211) per month 
are higher among Syrians without a work permit 
(estimated at 20 per cent by ILO) than among those 
with a work permit (about 10 per cent) (ILO, 2017). 
Hence, those refugees that obtain a work permit get 
some protection from exploitation. Syrians without a 
work permit often obtain jobs in areas that are legally 
closed for non-Jordanians, where they earn less than 
Jordanians, but much more than the minimum wage 
(authors’ interviews with Syrian refugees working in 
white-collar jobs in Amman).
Adjusting to the fact that agricultural workers 
change employers frequently during seasons and over 
the year, the Jordanian Ministry of Labour introduced 
a special work permit for ‘agricultural cooperatives’ 
in December 2016. Frequent change of agricultural 
employers can thus be covered by a single work permit, 
which is meant as an incentive for more Syrian refu-
gees to be employed with a work permit. Until the 
end of January 2018, the Ministry of Labour had issued 
31,074 work permits for Syrians under the section of 
‘cooperatives in agriculture’ (Government of Jordan, 
2018). The agricultural work permit does not contain 
any social security coverage, though (ILO, 2017). 
Until 2017, Syrian refugees used to be hired for 
short-term jobs, cash for work and employment-in-
tensive construction and infrastructure programmes 
in the refugee camps, funded by international devel-
opment agencies of the United Nations or bilateral 
development agencies (ILO, 2017; UN Women, 2015; 
GIZ, 2016). In the construction sector, workers gener-
ally change employers frequently and are employed 
in short-term jobs. In cooperation with the General 
Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU) and 
the Ministry of Labour, the ILO succeeded in estab-
lishing a cooperative solution in the construction 
sector like in agriculture. This allows Syrian refugees 
to change employers with the same work permit. 
The policies of work permit waivers
From the perspective of the planners of the EU–
Jordan Compact, one major obstacle to this endeav-
our is the cost of work permits (Collier & Betts, 2017). 
The fees for work permits for Arab migrant workers 
are between JOD 60 (US $84) in agriculture and JOD 
180 (US $254) in all other sectors permitted for mi-
grants. For non-Arab workers, permits cost about 
twice as much. Work permits have to be renewed  
annually or when a person changes their employer 
(Arida Law Firm, no year). 
To facilitate the implementation of the EU– 
Jordan Compact, a waiver of work permit fees for  
Syrian refugees (valid for three months) was issued 
by the Jordanian cabinet in December 2016. Since 
then, the waiver for Syrian refugees has been extended 
every three months (Government of Jordan, 2018). In 
December 2018, the Government of  Jordan extended 
the grace period until end of 2019 (Government of  
Jordan, 2018). Whereas in December 2015, only 4,000 
Syrians had obtained a work permit, until late 2018, 
the number of Syrians with a work permit allegedly 
had increased to 120,000 in those fields of employ-
ment permitted for non-Jordanians, among them 
five per cent women (UNHCR, 2017; 2019). 22 However, 
a study by the International Rescue Committee (IRC, 
2018) points out that many of the work permits are 
re-issued permits and not new ones. 23 Obviously, the 
number of work permits is still far from the envi-
sioned 200,000 for 2018. Moreover, an ILO survey re-
vealed that only 20 per cent of the Syrian employees 
with work permits were covered by social security 
even though it is required by Jordanian labour law 
(ILO, 2017). 24 
22 \  Another source mentions only four per cent women (Leghtas, 2018).
23 \  Some sources mention up to 112,000 work permits issued for Syrian 
refugees in Jordan (ILO, 2018). The government of Jordan, 2018, states 
that 105,404 work permits were issued between 1 January 2016 and 30 
June 2018). According to the government of Jordan (2018), 17,730 work 
permits were issued for Syrian refugees residing in Amman from 1 
January 2017 to 31 January 2018, and 9,740 between January and June 
2018, whereas 17,470 work permits were issued in the refugee camps 
over the same period (Government of Jordan, 2018). However, all these 
figures include renewals of work permits and, hence, do not provide 
evidence on the real number of refugees working in the formal eco-
nomy.
24 \  The sample comprised 450 Syrian refugees with and without work 
permits as well as employers in four governorates (ILO, 2017, p. 17).
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Lenner & Turner (2018) argue instead that em-
ployers may well understand the procedure but remain 
reluctant to apply for work permits for Syrians as 
without permits, employers benefit from a still 
cheap—and often skilled—labour force that cannot 
claim any labour rights.
In a study of 2017, the ILO admits that the attempts 
of the donors to formalise and regularise the labour 
market, to involve Syrian refugees in this market, and 
to boost growth through an export boom from Jordan 
to the European market is unlikely to lead to quick 
success (ILO, 2017, pp. 55-56). One significant obstacle 
is the fact that the Jordanian political economy is 
built on clear divisions of the Jordanian labour  
market into formal, migrant and informal sectors. 
The measures of the EU–Jordan Compact go counter 
this long-established system (Lenner & Turner, 2018). 
The current attempts at “(t)urning the Syrian refugee 
crisis into a development opportunity” (Lenner & 
Turner, 2018, p. 2) seem to be doomed to fail. Another 
obstacle stems from the Syrian refugees’ efforts to  
regain a livelihood that they consider appropriate, 
which is not in line with becoming factory workers. 
The next section provides insights into this that the 
author obtained during her research.  
Work and work permits in Jordan from 
the perspective of Syrian refugees
During the period of field research at the end of 
2016 and early 2017, most of the team's interview part-
ners did not know about the waiver on work permit 
fees and, therefore, had not tried to get a permit as 
they assumed that it would still be too expensive. 
However, for many, the waiver would not provide an 
incentive as their main problem was the limited  
access to the Jordanian labour market. Interview 
partners in the author's sample had been plumbers, 
electricians, shopkeepers or owners of various small 
businesses such as a laundry, a bakery, a repair work-
shop in Syria—professions for which they will not get 
a work permit in Jordan. Informally, without a con-
tract, insurance or permit, Syrian men work as occa-
sional labourers in painting and tiling, as food 
More than 16,000 flexible work permits were issued 
during the year following the introduction of this 
new regulation in August 2017 (Prieto, 2018). In 2018, 
the Ministry of Labour in cooperation with the ILO 
and the GFJTU introduced electronic work permits 
that can be extended digitally (ILO, 2018).
The ILO thus has put much effort into technical 
improvements alleviating administrative procedures, 
into negotiating one short-term waiver for work per-
mit fees for Syrian refugees after the other with the 
rather reluctant government of Jordan and into the 
introduction of cooperative work permits. Neverthe-
less, the participation of Syrian refugees in the formal 
labour market has remained low. According to a sur-
vey of mid-2017, only 23 per cent of interviewed Syrian 
respondents in Jordan reported working with a valid 
work permit. One reason for the low rate of work per-
mits in use is that employers are reluctant to register 
their employees formally because employing irregular 
migrants is cheaper. Another reason is that before  
receiving a work permit, an employee must have a 
regular status in Jordan, which many Syrian refugees 
do not have or do not get renewed (Achilli, 2017). Only 
two years into the implementation of the Jordan 
Compact, the government of Jordan, in the context of 
its regularisation policy, introduced the MoI card that 
allows refugees to stay in Jordan outside of camps  
legally (IRC, 2018; see also the Introduction of this 
Paper).
Still, in 2018, many Syrian refugees who had a 
work permit were not or only paid in part after they 
had finished their work—contrary to what had been 
agreed upon. Some did not receive a copy of the work 
contract. Many were not covered by social insurance 
or health insurance and did not get annual leave or 
sick leave. Overtime was rarely paid. Critics stated in 
The Jordan Times that the decisions about labour 
market integration of Syrian refugees 
were issued at such a rapid speed that it caused con-
fusion among employers and workers at the labour 
directorates … this whirlwind of successive decisions 
resulted in neither the worker nor the employer or 
even the employee at the directorate to understand 
the process of issuing permits (Linda Al-Kalash,  
Director of Tamkeen Fields for Aid, quoted in Prieto, 
2018a).
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For several Syrian women in the author's sample, 
having a work permit was less relevant for legal em-
ployment than for legalising their residency in urban 
areas rather than in the camp. Hence, before the  
government of Jordan finally regularised refugees 
through the MoI card, the work permit already ful-
filled this function as a de facto residence permit for 
Syrians. For example, Syrian refugees use the work 
permit to get a visa for Saudi Arabia allowing them 
(mostly Syrian women) to practice omra, a short pil-
grimage journey to the holy sites. Local Islamic cen-
tres in Greater Amman usually organise the pilgrim-
age for work permit holders upon request (author's 
interviews in Islamic centres in Greater Amman, 2016 
and 2017). These examples indicate that Syrians have 
a range of reasons to apply or not apply for work per-
mits; some are economic, but others are of a social 
and cultural nature. This implies that numbers of 
work permits issued hardly indicate fulfilment of the 
Jordan Compact’s aims of bringing 200,000 Syrian 
refugees into employment, but involve several other 
uses of the document. The findings indicate that free 
work permits intended to incorporate Syrian refugees 
in the lower layers of the Jordanian formal labour 
market do not meet the priorities Syrian refugees 
have for their livelihood.
Jobs as a livelihood option
Informal jobs and self-employment are crucial 
livelihood options for Syrian refugees, no matter 
whether these are legal or informal. Most importantly, 
these occupations ought to be, in the point of view of 
refugee men, appropriate and dignified. For them, 
livelihood does not just mean generating an income 
by any means. Although wages often are very low, and 
sometimes employers do not pay the illegal labourers 
at all, Syrian men go to great lengths to get jobs out-
side the house so that they preserve their role and 
self-esteem as men in the cultural context of Syrian 
families. They change employers when they are not 
paid at the end of their work and take many risks as 
illegally employed persons. However, often, employers 
protect them, as they benefit from cheap labour. In 
this sense, male Syrian refugees and Jordanian em-
vendors or as carpenters in Amman. Women usually 
work from home as hairdressers or food caterers for 
private customers. Income is badly needed to pay for 
the families’ food, rent and electricity bills, the medi-
cine and the debts several refugees owe previous or 
current landlords. 
Whereas the ILO (2017) report indicates that pay-
ment for Syrians is much lower than for Jordanians, 
the author's research findings suggest a more cau-
tious assessment. A Syrian shop vendor working for 
twelve hours per day is paid JOD 300 (US $422) per 
month, whereas Jordanians get JOD 450 (US $633) for 
the same job. However, a Jordanian serving in the 
army earns around JOD 300 (US $422) or 400 (US $562), 
the same as a bus driver and not much more than 
Syrian workers. A Syrian refugee working informally 
in a car wash earns JOD 8 (US $11.24) per day and 
about JOD 200 (US $281) a month and receives food 
coupons for his family in addition to this (authors’ 
interviews in Hittin camp, 2017). 
Though hardly any competition occurs between 
native Jordanians and Syrians, this is different for 
Jordanians with Palestinian origin, many of whom 
also work as informal labourers. Shop and workshop 
or service shop owners currently prefer to employ 
Syrians informally; they hardly care whether they 
work in fields closed to non-Jordanians or not. Infor-
mally employed Syrians thus compete mainly with 
Palestinian–Jordanians but not with Jordanians who 
are employed by the government or the army or in of-
fices of private companies (authors’ interviews in Ain 
al-Basha and al-Hussayn camp, 2016 and 2017).
Following the EU–Jordan Compact and related 
endeavours to increase the employment of Syrian  
refugee women, a young mother told the author that 
a friend had suggested that they could work in a 
chocolate factory in Marka near Amman. When the 
two women learnt that the wages were JOD 200 (US 
$281) and did not include transportation, they refused 
the offer, because they would need most of the wages 
to pay for transport. This illustrates a general percep-
tion by Syrian interview partners most of whom were 
not ready to work for wages that were by far not suffi-
cient to cover families’ basic needs.
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customers of Syrian refugee women’s home businesses 
are mainly other Syrian women; hence, they do not 
interfere in the markets of Jordanians (Grawert, 2019).
In the research team's (non-representative) sam-
ple, many Syrian refugee women are either not able 
to be homemakers who generate an income in this 
way, or they are unable to find customers. Some are  
ill and traumatised or have to care for sick children, 
parents, or husbands (authors’ interviews in Ain 
al-Basha, al-Hussayn camp and Hittin camp, 2016 
and 2017). Jobs or self-employment are not feasible  
for refugee women in these conditions, and some of 
them revert to prostitution or marrying off their 
daughters at a very young age as presented in the  
section on poverty above. As shown in the previous 
chapters, securing a family’s livelihood does not ex-
clusively depend on income generation. For refugees 
from Syria, an essential dimension of making a living 
in dignity is to belong to a network; most importantly, 
of family members.
ployers form a clandestine alliance against the  
restrictive government policy of closed professions. 
Women are as eager as men to secure the family’s 
livelihood. Some manage to contribute an extra in-
come through home business such as hairdressing, 
tailoring, catering and other small services, which 
they usually provide for other Syrian families. This  
is a decent way for Syrian women to work without  
exposing themselves to a perceived hostile public that 
manifests itself through harassment by Jordanian  
or Palestinian–Jordanian men. Until 2017, women’s 
income-generating activities were hidden activities 
that kept them protected within their houses and 
families and that did not come to the attention of state 
authorities (interviews with women in al-Hussayn 
and Ain al-Basha, 2016 and 2017). However, this 
changed when the government of Jordan introduced 
a new regulation for home-based businesses in October 
2017 in an attempt to include this sector in the formal 
economy, supported by the ILO and international 
NGOs. Syrian women running home-based micro- 
businesses will now become criminalised if they do 
not obtain licenses. Moreover, the government of  
Jordan introduced a ceiling for the support to refugees 
by NGOs. With this ceiling, the support provided by 
NGOs to Syrian home producers or service providers 
is greatly curtailed. 25 In November 2018, the govern-
ment amended the regulation, allowing registered 
home-based businesses in food-processing, handi-
crafts and tailoring to operate as long as 70 per cent  
of the support benefits Jordanians (Government of 
Jordan, 2018).
This effort to regulate the large shadow economy 
in Jordan has adverse effects on the livelihood of Syrian 
refugee families. Many of them depend on women’s 
small home businesses irrespective of the number of 
Jordanians working in the same sector. The regula-
tion—even after the amendment—is likely to increase 
families’ need for aid, thus contradicting measures of 
opening livelihood options for Syrian refugees that 
make them resilient. The argument by the govern-
ment that the regulation should prevent competition 
with Jordanians does not hold in this case as the 
25 \  US $4.2 million is the amount the Jordan Response Plan allows for 
the support of homemakers (IRC, 2018).
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Most striking has been the contrast between the 
endeavours of the international community to bring 
Syrian refugees into employment and the protection 
activities of the self-organised assistance groups. The 
analysis of the implementation of the EU–Jordan 
Compact revealed that the Compact contains a strong 
agenda driven by the interest of the European Union 
in keeping Syrian refugees out of Europe. For this pur-
pose, the two parties struck a deal that may alleviate 
access of Jordanian companies to the EU market, if 
they employ a fixed percentage of Syrians in their 
factories. Yet, the statements of Syrian refugees col-
lected in this Paper indicate that the Compact touches 
only marginally the livelihood intentions of its target 
group. the author's  research findings indicate that 
Syrian refugees are hardly interested in low-paid em-
ployment in factories. On the contrary, they intend to 
lead a life that accommodates their physical abilities 
and perception of their role as family head or mother  
(numerous Syrian men still suffer from injuries, are 
too old to work in a factory or want to use their skills 
in different professions to take care of their families; 
women do not want to be employed far away from 
their children for wages that are too low to make a 
living when transport costs are deducted). Counter to 
the imposed agenda of the EU–Jordan Compact, the 
self-organised groups seem to provide assistance to 
Syrian refugees that is tailored to their needs and fits 
into the refugees’ ideas of a life in dignity. Besides  
fulfilling basic and special (mainly medical) require-
ments, these self-organised groups meet social,  
cultural, psychological and religious needs of (single) 
mothers and children in particular, upon request. It 
has to be emphasised that these groups respond to 
specific demands of refugees flexibly and rapidly 
without any external agenda. 
The autor's analysis identified these self-organ-
ised assistance groups as an emerging social move-
ment consisting of independent initiatives by Jorda-
nians with Palestinian origin that work with Syrians 
as volunteers or for small rewards and operate in the 
Palestinian camps where many Syrians have sought 
refuge. Hence, these initiatives can be considered as 
part of the neighbourhood relations Syrian refugees 
This Paper has provided insights into how refu-
gees from Syria secure their livelihood in Greater  
Amman, mostly in the neighbourhoods (‘camps’) of 
host communities consisting predominantly of Jor-
danians with Palestinian origin. The refugees face all 
the typical constraints that come along with their 
status, such as restrictions of movement, numerous 
bureaucratic requirements, dependence on aid for  
social services and basic needs, limitations in oppor-
tunities to generate their income. After a high degree 
of solidarity of receiving communities in the Pales-
tinian camps, grievances increased due to rising 
rents and prices for commodities, which contributed 
to rising incidences where refugees had to endure 
harassment and discrimination. Many Syrian refu-
gees are traumatised from war, adding to the loss of 
self-help capacities as a result of their being refugees, 
constraining further the ability to determine on their 
own how they maintain their livelihood. 
The Paper applied ‘livelihood’ as a conceptual  
approach, thus emphasising the agency of refugees 
towards maintaining or re-gaining a way of life that 
they consider as keeping their human dignity. This 
research perspective brought the livelihood options 
existing in the receiving society, the access of refu-
gees to or their preclusion from these options and the 
role of neighbourhood relationships in enhancing or 
limiting refugees’ agency into the focus of research. 
The author systematically described 
1\ the needs that in the eyes of Syrian refugees must 
be satisfied to secure their livelihood and the  
limitations they are facing, 
2\ the role of neighbourhood relationships of Syrian 
refugees in Palestinian host communities with 
regard to the refugees’ livelihood, 
3\ the role of self-organised Jordanian–Palestinian 
support groups aiming to help the most needy  
refugees towards increased agency of the latter 
with regard to their livelihood, 
4\ measures by the international community (here 
the combined efforts of the UNHCR, ILO, EU and 
humanitarian and development agencies partici-
pating in the Livelihood Working Group) to influ-
ence the government of Jordan towards allevia-
ting access to employment for Syrian refugees.
Conclusion
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best manifests itself in gender relations that are 
characterised by the subjugation of women and girls.
Below the surface of a non-integrative arrangement 
of schooling, the author's  research has identified 
challenges to the educational system in Jordan as  
reflections of the tribalised society and the narrow 
political representation possible at the political level. 
Relationships with powerful patrons have become 
the means of pursuing individual interests (also in 
education) and personal achievement for Jordanians—a 
structure that excludes newcomers like the Syrian 
refugees. At the same time, the long history of settle-
ment of migrants and refugees in Jordan, particularly 
that of wealthy newcomers to the class of capital and 
landowners, may provide some Syrian newcomers 
from the middle class with the opportunity to gradu-
ally integrate in the long term.
Against this multi-dimensional and dynamic 
web of interaction within the society of Jordan, the 
assistance of the UNHCR and UNRWA single out  
particular (vulnerable) groups whom they provide 
with basic assistance according to rather technical 
criteria, which have to be approved by the govern-
ment of Jordan. 26 Hence, the interests of the govern-
ment and the UN agencies in keeping a bureaucratic 
control over the refugees are in the foreground. The 
measures of integrating Syrian refugees in the formal 
labour market through the EU–Jordan Compact  
appear to be a marginal endeavour against the multi-
tude of factors relevant to the livelihood of refugees 
from Syria. In this light, the self-organised assistance 
groups can be assessed as independent social forma-
tions that step into the breach left by the professional 
international agencies who pursue their agendas in 
cooperation with the Jordanian government. By call-
ing the professional agencies thieves and liars, the 
members of self-organised groups thus touch upon 
the complex web of self-interest that guides external 
interventions. The fact that the Jordanian govern-
ment, NGOs and the international agencies them-
selves benefit from the influx of aid meant to help 
26 \  The introduction of the iris scan to identify refugees eligible for as-
sistance is one example that confirms the interest in gaining compre-
hensive control over the refugees. The requirement of registration is 
another example for this. This excludes those refugees that are denied 
refuge for political reasons, like Palestinians fleeing from the war in 
Syria.
rely on to secure their livelihood. The author has 
shown that these relationships are ambiguous and 
have been subject to dynamics over time. After an 
initial generous welcoming reception of the refugees, 
Palestinian landlords and landladies have started to 
insist more strongly on the payment of rent and have 
increased it—partly as a response to rent payment for 
refugees by humanitarian agencies that the owners 
of flats rightly took as an opportunity to make a profit. 
In contrast to that trend, the members of the self- 
organised social initiatives assisting refugees have 
upheld their initial empathy and tried to help them 
in anyway they can. 
Following an initial period during which Pales-
tinian–Jordanians had perceived the Syrians as  
people that shared the same fate of being displaced, 
refugees increasingly felt and were regarded as ‘dif-
ferent’ . The author used the dynamics of established–
outsider relations that often lead to a stronger  
perception of coherence among the group of the es-
tablished (here Palestinian–Jordanians in the camps) 
versus the outsiders (the refugees from Syria who 
tend to enclose themselves in their houses and con-
centrate on family affairs, avoiding interaction with 
neighbours) to explain the growing feeling of being 
different. Social inequality and class differences con-
tributed to a widening gap between established and 
outsiders, in particular where Syrians came from a 
middle-class background and currently live among 
disadvantaged and lower-class Palestinians. However, 
as the study showed, hostile perceptions of Syrian 
neighbours may also come from members of the  
Palestinian–Jordanian middle class, strengthening 
the explanation provided by the established-outsider 
figuration. 
The research findings also indicate that Syrian 
women and children, in particular, have become vic-
tims of harassment by Jordanians, Jordanian–Pales-
tinians and foreigners who all increasingly exploit 
the dire situation of desperately impoverished Syrian 
widows, single mothers, and their children and harass 
them pretending that they want to help but in reality 
making shady offers of marriage. The growing social 
gap between the established and the outsiders thus 
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the refugees and receiving communities is one di-
mension of the deep-seated mistrust expressed by 
the self-organised groups. Using the distress of the 
Syrian refugees as a gateway to formalising the large 
informal economy of Jordan is a second dimension 
that generates fears in the population that the de-
struction of admittedly precarious jobs may lead to 
an overall reduction of 
income opportunities. This shows that the agenda  
of enhancing resilience and promoting refugees' self- 
reliance does not start from the refugees’ own priorities 
and intentions about their livelihood. Instead, this 
agenda is part of an external idea of a liberal market 
economy that may have chances to expand when 
governments come under pressure because they have 
to host high numbers of refugees. 
The sobering result of this analysis is that there 
is no interest on the part of international agencies 
and the Jordanian government to enhance the agency 
of refugees and open avenues to self-determinedly  
secure their livelihoods. Neither will they decriminalise 
politically unwanted self-organised groups that help 
refugees. Hence their desperately needed work will 
continue underground.
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List of interview partners
Families and individuals in Greater Amman
   \ Older Syrian family, Hay Amir Ali, November 
2016
   \ Syrian widow and neighbour, Hay Amir Ali,  
December 2016
   \ Palestinian–Jordanian landlady, Hai al-Zaitoon, 
Ain al-Basha, November 2016
   \ Syrian couple, Hai al-Zaitoon, Ain al-Basha,  
November 2016
   \ Syrian trader, Ain al-Basha, January 2017
   \ Syrian woman, al-Hussayn camp, January 2017
   \ Syrian woman with widowed daughters, 
al-Hussayn camp, January 2017
   \ Syrian Palestinian family, al-Hussayn camp, 
January 2017
   \ Palestinian–Jordanian older man and his wife, 
al-Hussayn camp, January 2017
   \ Palestinian–Jordanian taxi driver, Amman, 
January 2017
   \ Palestinian–Jordanian shop owners, Hittin 
camp, January 2017
   \ Syrian worker, Hittin camp, January 2017
   \ Syrian family, Hittin camp, January 2017
   \ Syrian woman, Hittin camp, January 2017
   \ Syrian student, university, November 2016
   \ Syrian man, university, December 2016
   \ Palestinian–Jordanian man, Amman, January 
2017
   \ Syrian Christian man, Amman, January 2017
   \ Syrian man with work permit, Amman,  
January 2017
   \ Iraqi family, Amman, January 2017
   \ Syrian woman, Dowar al-Sina’a
   \ Syrian woman teacher, Marka, November 2016
Interviews outside Amman
   \ Jordanian pastor, Mafraq, November 2016
   \ Syrian family in Um al-Sarb village near  
Mafraq, November 2016
   \ Syrian teacher, Mafraq – al-Hussayn camp,  
November 2016
Charity initiatives
   \ Islamic centre in Ain al-Basha, several visits 
between November 2016 and July 2017
   \ JOHUD, Amman, November 2016 (interview 
with the human resources manager)
   \ Molham Team, Amman, several visits between 
November 2016 and January 2017
   \ Student Unit assisting Syrian refugees, Univer-
sity of Amman, November 2016 and January 
2017
   \ Volunteers for Syrian refugee assistance,  
Amman, November 2016
Expert talks and meetings
   \ Ann-Christin Wagner, Amman and Mafraq,  
November 2016
   \ Anja Wehler-Schöck, Friedrich Ebert Founda-
tion, November 2016
   \ Dr Oroub al-Abed, Amman, January 2017
   \ UNHCR Livelihood Working Group, Amman, 
November 2016 – January 2017
   \ Nina Lutter, BMZ, January 2017
   \ Hani Khleifat, Mohammed Badran, Eman  
Qaraeen, GIZ, January 2017
   \ Diana Potpara, UNRWA, Amman, January 2017
   \ Dr Salih Alkilani, Ministry of Labour, Amman, 
January 2017
   \ Maha Katta, ILO, Amman, January 2017
   \ Meeting for discussion of the research project 
at the Institut français du proche-orient (Ifpo), 
Amman
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
FSA Free Syrian Army FSA
GFJTU General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions GFJTU
GIZ Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German development agency) GIZ
IDP Internally displaced person IDP
ILO International Labour Organisation ILO
JOD Jordanian Dinar JOD
JOHUD Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development JOHUD
NGO Non-governmental organisation NGO
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization PLO
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR
UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund UNICEF
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency UNRWA
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ANNEX
Governorate No. of 
inhabitants*
% of 
population
No. of registered 
refugees** 
% of registered 
refugees per 
governorate
Registered refugees 
per governorate 
population
Amman Governorate 4,000,000 42.0 175,381 26.8 4.4
Mafraq Governorate 549,948 5.8 158,165 24.1 28.8
Irbid Governorate 1,770,000 18.6 135,364 20.7 7.6
Zarqa Governorate 1,364,000 14.3 109,103 16.6 8.0
Balqa Governorate 491,709 5.2 18,902 2.9 3.8
Madaba Governorate 189,192 2.0 10,781 1.6 5.7
Jarash Governorate 237,959 2.5 9,605 1.5 4.0
Dispersed in Jordan 9,377 1.4
Karak Govenorate 316,629 3.3 8,513 1.3 2.7
Ajlun Governorate 176,080 1.8 7,873 1.2 4.5
Maan Governorate 144,083 1.5 7,480 1.1 5.2
Aqaba Governorate 188,160 2.0 3,362 0.5 1.8
Tafilah Governorate 96,291 1.0 1,493 0.2 1.6
TOTAL 9,524,051 100.0 655,399 99.9
Annex 1 
Registered refugees by region as of January 2017
Sources: UNHCR 2017c; Ghazal 2016 reporting about national census data as of November 2015
Notes: * November 2015   ** January 2017
.
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At least 240,000 Palestinians arrived in Jordan in 
the context of the war of 1967, when Jordan lost the 
West Bank to Israel, and Israel occupied the Gaza 
strip. 2 Soon after, a growing social cleavage between 
Palestinians originating from the West Bank and  
native Jordanians (so-called ‘East Bankers’) came to 
the surface during the ‘Black September’ in 1970, 
when the Jordanian King Hussein declared military 
rule and the Jordanian Armed Forces clashed with 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under 
the leadership of Yasser Arafat (Gilen et al. 1994). The 
Jordanian government expelled and killed thousands 
of Palestinian fighters (fedayeen) whom it accused of 
establishing a ‘state within the state’ and undermin-
ing the power of the King. Following this traumatic 
event, a group of Palestinians founded the ‘Black Sep-
tember’ as a clandestine organisation operating as a 
branch of the military wing of the PLO (International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2008). 
Refugees from Gaza, most of whom arrived during 
and after the war of 1967, were never granted citizen-
ship rights in Jordan. They have to apply for residence 
and work permits like any other foreigner. During the 
following decades, they were only allowed to travel if 
they had Egyptian travel documents and had to apply 
for a return visa before departing from Jordan; other-
wise, they were not allowed to enter Jordan again  
(El-Abed 2012: 4). In 1983, the Jordanian government 
introduced a colour-coded system of travel documents 
according to which the travel documents of Palestini-
ans originating from Gaza were labelled ‘blue cards’ 
while Jordanian citizens living in the West Bank  
received ‘green cards’, and those who originated from 
the West Bank but stayed within Jordan were given 
‘yellow cards’ (ARRD, 2015). 3 All Palestinians except 
those from Gaza thus were granted Jordanian citizen-
ship (Gabbay, 2014).
2 \  Palestinian sources estimated the number of refugees and their  
descendants at up to 800,000 in 1996 (Shiblak, 1996).
3 \  The coloured cards were relevant for the Jordanian government to  
document how many Palestinians crossed the border to Israel and  
returned (BADIL, 2014).
Annex II:  
Status of Palestinian refugees in Jordan
Palestinians have a different citizenship status  
in Jordan according to their time of arrival and place 
of origin (Gaza or West Bank); they also have been 
subject to policy changes. This Annex is structured 
accordingly. 1
Palestinians arriving in the context of the First 
Arab–Israeli War in 1948
According to Art. 3, B of the 1954 Nationality Act of 
Jordan, Palestinians who had the Palestinian nation-
ality before 15 May 1948, and resided in the Kingdom 
of Jordan between 20 December 1949 and 16 February 
1954, were considered Jordanian citizens. The right to 
nationality entailed the right to education, medical 
care, work, property ownership, travel and state pro-
tection (Shiblak, 1996) and concerned an estimated 
number of round 440,000 persons. Granting Palestinians 
who arrived in 1948 citizenship rights did not result 
in the loss of their status as refugees as defined by 
UNRWA (Fafo, 1994) and allows UNRWA to provide 
vulnerable persons among the Palestinians with  
assistance. Due to the history of displacement of  
Palestinians and the particular role of Jordan as host 
country, the Kingdom of Jordan refused to sign the 
Geneva Convention of 1951 so that Jordan would  
never be considered as an alternative homeland to 
Palestinians.
Palestinians arriving as a result of the ‘Six Day War’ 
of June 1967
A new wave of displaced Palestinians arrived in 
Jordan in 1967. Like those displaced in 1948, the vast 
majority sought refuge in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. 
The legal framework on residency of each state 
shapes the livelihoods of the Palestinians (ARDD, 
2015). This framework determines the conditions of 
“personal security, economic opportunities and social 
situation of refugees” (Gilen et al. 1994).
1 \ Due to limitations of space, this Paper will not explain the causes and 
details of the Arab-Israeli wars.
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sovereignty over this territory (Shiblak, 1996).4 Around 
1.5 million Palestinians who were living in the West 
Bank (‘green card holders’) in 1988 were now consid-
ered Palestinian citizens. In an interview, the lawyer 
Anis F. Kassim stated, “over one-and-a-half million 
Palestinians went to bed on 31 July 1988 as Jordanian 
citizens, and woke up on 1 August 1988 as stateless 
persons” (BADIL, 2010, p. 25). Those staying in the 
West Bank could get temporary passports without a 
national number, 5 which allows them to visit Jordan 
for 30 days at a time, but does not provide the right of 
permanent residency in Jordan (Shiblak, 1996). These 
passports were extended to ‘two-year passports’ that 
have to be renewed regularly; for some, they have 
been extended to ‘five-year passports’ since 1995 
(Shiblak, 1996). However, as these passports are issued 
without a national number, their worth is limited to 
that of a travel document. The status of Palestinians 
from the West Bank henceforth resembled those 
from Gaza, who have always relied on travel docu-
ments (blue cards). 6 To make things worse for the 
Palestinians, the government of Jordan has put obsta-
cles in place for Palestinians who want to renew their 
temporary passports (Gilen et al. 1994; BADIL 2010; 
UN, 2014; Gabbay, 2014). 
187,000 individuals lost their Jordanian citizen-
ship due to this change of rules (El-Abed 2012: 3). The 
‘East Bankers’ and Palestinians originating from the 
West Bank and staying abroad or in Jordan already 
(‘yellow card’ holders), however, kept their status and 
enjoyed Jordanian citizenship rights. 
4 \  The political background was to give way to the PLO as main negotia-
tor with the United States and Israel about the future of Palestine; in 
this way, the government of Jordan tried to enforce international reco-
gnition of the PLO as representative of the Palestinians (BADIL, 2014).
5 \  According to Gabbay (2014), every Jordanian citizen “is issued a num-
ber which serves as proof of Jordanian nationality. This number allows 
citizens to enjoy basic rights, and is needed for a myriad of day-to-day 
necessities. For example, the national number is required to acquire a 
driver’s license, to buy and sell property (including stocks and bonds), 
vote, and open a bank account. This number is also the distinguishing 
factor of what a Jordanian passport means for its holder.”
6 \  Only Palestinian women from Gaza who are married to a Jordanian 
national can get the ‘two-year passport’, too (Fafo, 1994; Gilen et al., 
1994; MRG, 2016). Since 1994, the government of Egypt has stopped is-
suing travel documents for Palestinians from Gaza and only allows 
students and medical patients with special permission to enter the 
country (Shiblak, 1996).
Constraints for Palestinians in Jordan following the 
‘Black September’ of 1970
Since the events of the ‘Black September’, Pales-
tinian political activity has been considered a sensitive 
subject in Jordan, and full integration of Palestinians 
is not desired for political reasons (Gilen et al., 1994).
The concern of the Jordanian government about 
political and religious radicalism among Palestinians 
has been reflected in the fact that Palestinians have 
been underrepresented in the Jordanian government 
throughout. In the 1993 election law, the Jordanian 
government designed constituencies for the ballot for 
the Chamber of Deputies in a way that diluted urban 
and thus Palestinian representation. As a response, 
Islamist parties and their largely Palestinian constit-
uents boycotted the elections of 1997 “in protest 
against the skewed apportionment of seats to the 
monarchy's rural base of (non-Palestinian) supporters” 
(MRG, 2016). Jordan is divided into twelve governo-
rates, but none is led by a Palestinian. Only nine of 
the 55 senators appointed by the King of Jordan are 
Palestinian, and in the Chamber of Deputies, Pales-
tinians have only 18 out of 110 seats (MRG, 2016). The 
fears of Palestinian political activism by the Jordanian 
state and society have also been the main reason why 
access of Palestinians to employment in the public 
sector has been sharply restricted. Only those who  
received ‘family cards’ could find employment in  
the public sector, received social services and were al-
lowed to send their children to school (Shiblak, 1996). 
According to MRG (2016), discrimination against Pal-
estinians is also common in the private sector, and a 
quota system limits the number of university admis-
sions for Palestinians. Moreover, “(g)overnment secu-
rity operations disproportionately target Palestinians, 
especially operations conducted in the name of fight-
ing terror” (MRG 2016). 
Repercussions of the withdrawal of Jordan from the 
West Bank in 1988 for Palestinians
In 1988, King Hussein declared the ‘administra-
tive disengagement’ from the occupied territory of 
the West Bank and relinquished Jordan’s claims for 
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moved to Jerash refugee camp (‘Gaza camp’) and Hittin 
camp in Marka, just outside Amman. Both camps  
receive services from UNRWA (IRB, 2014). The group 
of Palestinian refugees from Gaza and those who  
remained in the West Bank after 1967 and only later 
came to Jordan are estimated at 150,000 persons 
(MRG, 2016).
Soon after this change in the legal status of Pales-
tinians in Jordan, the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait of 1990 
caused around 300,000 displaced Palestinians from 
Kuwait and other Gulf countries to seek refuge in Jor-
dan. As a response, the Jordanian government further 
restricted the rights of Palestinians.
Revocation of Jordanian citizenship from Palestinians
In the mid-2000s, the Jordanian authorities in-
creasingly revoked the Jordanian citizenship of Pal-
estinians, even of those who held ‘yellow cards’, and 
issued them ‘green cards’ with temporary permits of 
residence instead. Legal and human rights organisa-
tions claim that this has rendered an increasing 
number of Palestinians in Jordan de facto stateless 
and, as a result of this, denies them access to employ-
ment, as they require a work permit like foreigners, 
and employers are obliged to prove that no Jordanian 
has been available with a suitable qualification for 
the job. Moreover, those Palestinian refugees whose 
citizenship was revoked are not able to work as pro-
fessionals (for example, in engineering or law), as this 
requires membership in professional associations, 
which is only allowed for people with Jordanian citi-
zenship. Furthermore, the children of the Palestinians 
whose citizenship was revoked lost access to free 
schooling and subsidised university studies; costs for 
health care and interactions with Jordanian authorities 
are higher; they are not able to buy property, register 
a car or liquidate investments. The revocation of Jor-
danian citizenship was introduced without previous 
warnings and rather arbitrarily (HRW, 2010; ARRD, 
2015). The legal rights organisation ARRD states that 
“(t)he revocation of Palestinian–Jordanian nationality 
is in contravention of the Jordanian Constitution 
which states in Article 5 that nationality is defined by 
law, and thus should not be removable through an ad-
Increased arbitrariness in granting citizenship to 
Palestinians during the 1990s
The Jordanian two-year passport serves as an 
identification document, a residence permit, and a 
travel document (UN, 2014). However, Arab states do 
not recognise the Jordanian ‘ two-year passport’ and 
hence, do not issue visa to Palestinians, which re-
stricts their freedom of movement. Already in 1994, 
Syria started to deny entry to Palestinians with Jorda-
nian passports or coming from the occupied territo-
ries (Shiblak, 1996). 
The government of Syria issued similar regula-
tions as Jordan for the status of Palestinians living in 
Syria. Palestinians are granted equal civil rights as 
Syrian citizens but are excluded from citizenship, the 
right to vote, and the right to own property except for 
their own residency. Both countries allow Palestinians 
to work; in Jordan, however, this pertains only to 
those with a ‘five-year passport’. Both governments 
allow Palestinians only very limited access to em-
ployment in the public sector (ten per cent in Jordan 
in 1996). Whereas the government of Syria extended 
its services equally to the Palestinian refugees, Jordan 
increasingly curtailed the services (Shiblak, 1996).
Within Jordan, the temporary passport served 
the Jordanian government to curtail Palestinians’ 
residency rights, rights to work and property owner-
ship as well as their access to social services, access to 
education, health care and social benefits (Shiblak, 
1996). Hence, Palestinians who hold a two-year pass-
port have to live with legal restrictions, and have to 
cope with unsafe living conditions (UN, 2014). They 
are not allowed to seek employment in the public or 
private sector, apply for a driving license for public 
transport, go into higher education, open a bank  
account or own shops or real estate. They are not  
allowed to invest and thus, have fewer rights than 
foreigners (El-Abed, 2012, p. 4). If they want to renew 
their passport, they have to pay fees (HRW, 2010). 
Furthermore, the Jordanian authorities withdrew 
the travel documents of some Palestinians originat-
ing from Gaza who had joined military groups out-
side Jordan in the 1990s and then returned (El-Abed, 
2012, p. 5). Most Palestinian refugees from this group 
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ministrative act of the state” (ARRD, 2015, p. 5).  
According to Gabbay (2014), “(t)he random and fickle 
nature of who is allowed to retain citizenship holds 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin in a perpetual state 
of uncertainty.”
In 2009, the Jordanian Follow-up and Inspection 
Department of the Ministry of the Interior main-
tained that it would review another 300,000 Palestini-
an–Jordanians (‘yellow card’ holders). Subsequently, 
Palestinian refugees have used relationships to influ-
ential persons (wasta) to get protection from the  
revocation of their citizenship rights (HRW, 2010). In 
2012, the review was transferred to the Jordanian gov-
ernmental department of Passports and Civil Affairs, 
which needed the approval of the cabinet to with-
draw ‘yellow cards’. The department received 3,400  
petitions of grievance and reinstated 129 citizenships 
(ARRD, 2015). A representative of UNRWA summaris-
es: “The preconditions for Palestinians to reside in 
Jordan depend both on the particular individual's 
date of entry to Jordan (e. g. 1948, 1967, post-January 
2013) and the most recent place of residence from 
which the Palestine refugee has fled (e. g. the legal 
status is different if a Palestine refugee fled from Gaza 
in 1967, or from the West Bank in 1967)” (UN, 2014). 
This has created varying legal statuses for the about 
three million Palestinians in Jordan and thus varying 
rights, responsibilities and burdens (ARDD, 2015; 
MRG, 2016).
LIVELIHOOD ANALYSIS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN GREATER AMMAN \ E. GRAWERT 
61 \ \ WORKING PAPER 4  \ 2019
LIVELIHOOD ANALYSIS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN GREATER AMMAN \ E. GRAWERT 
62 \ \ WORKING PAPER 4  \ 2019
LIVELIHOOD ANALYSIS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN GREATER AMMAN \ E. GRAWERT 
63 \ \ WORKING PAPER 4  \ 2019
bicc \  
Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn 
Bonn International Center for Conversion GmbH
Pfarrer-Byns-Straße 1, 53121 Bonn, Germany 
+49 (0)228 911 96-0, Fax -22, bicc@bicc.de 
www.bicc.de 
www.facebook.com/bicc.de 
ISSN (Print) 2522-204X
ISSN (Online) 2521-781X
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under:  
cf. creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Director for Research  
Professor Dr Conrad Schetter 
Director for Administration 
Michael Dedek
AUTHOR
Dr Elke Grawert is Senior Researcher at BICC 
with input by Rawan Alhomeimat 
COPYEDITING
Heike Webb
PUBLICATION DATE
25 March 20195
EDITORIAL DESIGN   
Diesseits – Kommunikationsdesign, Düsseldorf
The study has been facilitated by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) as part of 
the research project “Protected rather than protracted. Strengthening refugees and peace”.  All views expressed in the Working 
Paper are the sole responsibility of the author and should not be attributed to BMZ or any other institution or person.
